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SUPREME COURT REVIEW
FOREWORD: MAIL FRAUD AFTER
McNALL Y AND CARPENTER: THE
ESSENCE OF FRAUD
CRAIG M. BRADLEY*
I. INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions1 the Supreme Court has attempted to
discern the essence of the crime of fraud under the federal mail and
wire fraud statutes.2 In McNally v. United States,3 decided in June of
1987, the Court struck down a conviction premised on the de-
frauding of the citizens of a state of their "intangible right to good
government. ' 4 The Court held that the mail fraud statute is limited
to schemes "aimed at causing deprivations of money or property." 5
The Court tempered McNally considerably in Carpenter v. United
States6 by unanimously concluding that "intangible" interests, such
as an employer's confidential business information, were "property"
within the mail fraud statute when misappropriated by an
employee. 7
The reaction to McNally could not have been stronger. A
* Professor of Law and Ira Batman Faculty Fellow, Indiana University School of
Law. The author is a former Senior Trial Attorney, Public Integrity Section, Criminal
Division, United States Department of Justice and Assistant United States Attorney,
Washington, D.C.
The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professors Bob Blakey, Don Gjerd-
ingen, Joe Hoffman, Gerry Lynch, and Bill Popkin for their helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article.
1 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987) was termed "blockbusting" by
Judge Aldisert, dissenting in United States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 517 (3d Cir. 1987)(Al-
dersert, J., dissenting).
2 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 (1982).
3 107 S. Ct. at 2875.
4 Id. at 2878.
5 Id. at 2881.
6 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
7 Id. at 320-21.
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Washington attorney deemed it "one of the most devastating blows
to the Justice Department in years."" Similarly, Congressman Cony-
ers of Michigan, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Criminal Justice, called it "a crippling blow" and introduced legisla-
tion to change the statute to include intangible rights. 9 The
Harvard Law Review accused the Court of "fail[ing] to fulfill its
role" in statutory interpretation and "insulating schemes of unques-
tionably criminal character from federal prosecution". 10 This reac-
tion culminated in an amendment to the mail fraud statute which is
discussed in the last section of this Article.
To the extent that the critics were referring to past or pending
cases that would have to be reconsidered in light of McNally, their
prediction that the decision would have a major impact was surely
correct. In just over a year since McNally was decided, the federal
courts of appeal have decided twenty-three reported cases involving
McNally issues and twelve convictions have been wholly or partially
reversed on that ground. Given the unanimity of opinion in the
lower courts prior to McNally that intangible rights to "good gov-
ernment," "honest and faithful services" of an employee, etc., could
be the basis of a fraud conviction, this outcome is not surprising. A
conflict in the circuits is already developing as to the retroactivity of
McNally and the problem of convictions which are based on some
combination of "property" and "non-property" interests will con-
tinue to be a knotty one for cases that were tried or indicted before
McNally. These issues will be discussed later in this Article.
The impact of McNally for the future is less clear. Of course the
government will have to abandon the popular "intangible interests"
language in future indictments."I But most cases which the govern-
ment seeks to prosecute under the mail fraud statute involve either
the acquisition or the deprivation of money or property. In McNally
itself, for example, the defendants obtained over $200,000 to which
they were not entitled.' 2 While the government was never able to
pin down exactly who the victim was, when $200,000 is missing,
there is usually somebody who is out the money. In the political
corruption cases, the federal government will frequently be able to
get around McNally by finding a victim who is deprived of money or
8 U.S. Prosecutors Reel in Wake of Mail Fraud Ruling, Nat'l L.J.,July 20, 1987, at 1, col.
1. See also Kaplan, The Convictions that Weren't, 2 CRIM. JUST. 4 (1988).
9 New York LawJournal, September 1, 1987, at 1, col. 1. The legislation ultimately
enacted by Congress is discussed in the last section of this Article.
10 The Supreme Court, 1986 Term, 101 HARV. L. REV. 119, 330 (1987).
11 But see the new statutory provisions discussed infra notes 277-94 and accompany-
ing text.
12 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2878 (1987).
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property. Similarly, given Carpenter, in many cases in which money is
not directly involved, some sort of intangible "property" interest
may be found, depending on where the courts draw the line be-
tween property and non-property rights. These issues will be dis-
cussed in greater detail later in this Article. 13
The more important question, however, underlying all the
others, including those dealt with in McNally and Carpenter is, "What
is the essence of fraud?" In McNally the Court partially answered
this question by holding that money or property must be involved.' 4
But there are further questions that must be answered before the
concept of fraud, and hence the meaning of the mail fraud statute, is
fully understood. Specifically, the questions are: Does "fraud" re-
quire a victim? and, Does a fraud imply either a loss to the victim, an
unjust gain to the perpetrator, both, or neither?
These questions are not merely of general, theoretical interest.
They are of immediate and vital concern to attorneys and judges
concerned with litigating cases under the mail fraud statute. Con-
sider the statute:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice
to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations or promises ... for the purpose
of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so [uses the
mails or causes them to be used] shall be fined .... 15
Note that the statute refers to two types of "scheme(s) or arti-
fice(s)." Those "to defraud" and those "for obtaining money or
property by means of false pretenses, representations or
promises." 16 In McNally the Court held that the term "to defraud"
in the first clause was implicitly limited to money or property, just as
the prohibition against "false pretenses, representations or
promises" was explicitly so limited in the second clause.17 The
Court did not thereby necessarily conclude that the two clauses were
identical' 8 but only that the object of the scheme, money or property,
must be the same. McNally further held that "defraud" in Clause 1,
13 See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
14 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
15 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982). Section 1343 is identical except that it refers to use of
"wire, radio or television transmission in interstate commerce" instead of the mails. 18
U.S.C.§ 1343 (1982).
16 Actually, the statute also prohibits a third type of scheme as well: "or to sell, dis-
pose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security or other article or
anything represented to be [such a counterfeit article] .... " 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
17 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880 (1987).
18 As Justice Stevens observed, dissenting in McNally: "The Court recognizes that
the 'money or property' limitation of the second clause does not actually apply to prose-
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"usually signifjies] the deprivation of something of value."' 19 It did
not decide whether the "obtaining" language of Clause 2 similarly
was limited to such deprivations or whether an unjust gain alone
might suffice to convict under that clause.20 Consider the following
two cases:
Case I: A and B are polygraph operators who share office
space. Because of a personal grudge, A takes B's letter renewing his
license from the "Out" box and destroys it. Then he writes B's cus-
tomers, under an assumed name, telling them that B is unlicensed.
A has no expectation of any gain from this activity. 21
Case II: A is employed by Megacorp as a purchasing officer.
He is required by the company to "accept no outside remuneration
in any form from any source with which the company does business
and to disclose offers of any such remuneration to the company."
Megacorp sets the price at which it will purchase veeblefitzers. A's
job is to find a supply at that price that meets Megacorp's quality
guidelines. A arranges with North American Veeblefitzer Corp. to
supply Megacorp's needs at the fixed price and conforming to
Megacorp's specifications. North American pays A $10,000 for giv-
ing it the business. A does not disclose it. The comptroller of
Megacorp will testify that the company has "no procedure" for
somehow taking the $10,000 as a discount. A should simply have
given it back.22
In Case I there is a loss to the victim but no gain to the defend-
ant. In Case II there is a gain but no loss. 23 Neither McNally nor
Carpenter decided explicitly whether either of these cases, if charged
cutions under the first clause." McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2887
(1987)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
19 Id. at 2881.
20 "Although the Government now relies in part on the assertion that the petitioners
obtained property by means of false representations . . . there was nothing in the jury
charge that required such a finding." Id. at 2882.
21 These are the facts of United States v. Baldinger, 838 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1988).
The Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's conviction on the ground that there was
no motive to "gain" and that such a motive is essential to a fraud case.
22 The facts of this case are similar to United States v. Covino, 837 F.2d 35 (2d Cir.
1988) See also United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1983)(defendant em-
ployee provided information to a shipper that allowed it to underbid competitors for his
firm's shipping business. He was held to have defrauded his firm of its intangible right
to the loyal and faithful services of its employee, though his firm lost no money); Mc-
Nally, 107 S. Ct. at 2879; United States v. Murphy, 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir. 1988); United
States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347 (4th Cir. 1979).
23 Arguably, however, the class of competitors for the veeblefitzer contract were vic-
tims who suffered a "loss"-for example, the opportunity to compete for the contract.
See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text. For the purposes of analyzing this case it
is sufficient to assume that, as in Covino, the government failed to charge any such loss.
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under a "money or property," rather than an "intangible rights"
theory, is a violation of the mail fraud statute despite the fact that
both, obviously, involve "property." Yet the answer to the question
of whether mail fraud requires either a gain, a loss, neither or both
is at the heart of many of the cases that have troubled the courts in
recent years24 and that will trouble them even more now that Mc-
Nally has eliminated the "intangible interests" approach which had
allowed the government to proceed to trial without ever clearly de-
fining who was defrauded of what.
II. THE MCNALLY AND CARPENTER HOLDINGS
The McNally case presented a good fact situation to the Court
because it typified the government's cavalier approach to defining
both the victim and the object of the fraud, an approach that the
courts of appeals had been enthusiastically endorsing for years. At
first blush, McNally seems to present a clear case of criminality:
Kentucky Democratic Party officials getting rich at the taxpayer's ex-
pense. But like cotton candy, though this case appears substantial,
when it is bitten into, there is no substance. The defendants in Mc-
Nally were not charged with defrauding the state of money25 but
only with defrauding the citizens of their intangible right to good
government. A complete understanding of the case requires a trip
into the darkest reaches of Kentucky politics.
In 1974, after the election of Democratic Governor Carroll, de-
fendant Hunt 26 became Democratic Party Chairman. As such he
had de facto control over the selection of insurance agencies with
which the state would do business. 27 He arranged with Wombwell
Insurance Company to obtain workmen's compensation insurance
for the state. Wombwell's job was to arrange coverage with a big
national insurer, in this case Hartford Insurance Company.28 Pursu-
ant to established practice and consistent with Kentucky law, Hart-
ford paid Wombwell a "commission" of 5% of the premiums
tendered. This totaled $1,051,000 over four years.29 However, this
money was never destined for Wombwell alone. Rather Wombwell
24 E.g., Baldinger, 838 F.2d at 178; Covino, 837 F.2d at 35; Lemire, 720 F.2d at 1327.
25 "[There is no charge . . . that the Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any
money or property." McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
26 Hunt pled guilty to one count of intangible rights mail fraud and one count of tax
fraud. Consequently he was not before the Supreme Court. Id. at 2879.
27 Id.
28 Brief for the United States at 3, McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875
(1987)(No. 86-422). United States Fire Insurance also supplied coverage during part of
the period covered in the indictment. Id.
29 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2878.
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agreed with Hunt that it would receive $50,000 per year (a total of
$200,000 over four years) and it distributed the rest ($851,000) to
various other insurance agencies designated by Hunt. Over four
years 21 agencies were so designated and they received the
$851,000. It was undisputed that this practice of sharing commissions among
insurance agents was an accepted and lawful matter of political patronage in
Kentucky.30
So far then, even in the government's view, there was no fraud.
The fraud occurred when Hunt, Gray (a high state government offi-
cial)3 1 and McNally, a private businessman, set up a fake "insurance
agency," Seton Investments, to receive a share of these commis-
sions. Pursuant to Hunt's instructions, Wombwell paid $200,000 to
Seton Investments over four years. 32 McNally was the nominal
owner of Seton; Hunt's and Gray's interest was secret, but they got
the money. 33
Hunt pled guilty to one count of mail and one of tax fraud.3 4
Gray and McNally35 were indicted for one count of conspiracy to
commit mail fraud and seven counts of mail fraud, six of which were
dismissed before trial.36 The single remaining mail fraud count in-
volved a check mailed by Hartford to Wombwell and alleged both
that the defendants had devised a scheme (1) to "defraud the citi-
zens of Kentucky... of their right to have the Commonwealth busi-
ness and its affairs conducted honestly, impartially, free from
corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official misconduct and fraud"37
and (2) "to obtain money (and property) by means of false and
fraudulent pretenses. ... 38 Though the government argued that
30 "[I]t was not charged that requiring the Wombwell agency to share commissions
violated state law. We should assume that it did not." Id. at 2881 n.9.
31 Brief for the United States at 4.
32 Id.
33 Id. McNally's cut came from another agency, Snodgrass, which, at Hunt's direc-
tion, got $77,500 from Wombwell and passed it on to McNally. Id. at 5.
34 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
35 Since Mr. McNally was not a government official, nor a person who, like Hunt,
exercised de facto control over governmental affairs, he clearly owed no such duty to the
citizens of Kentucky. He was convicted on the theory that he aided and abetted the
scheme. Brief for the United States at 10-11.
36 The six counts dismissed alleged Seton's tax returns as mailings in furtherance of
the scheme. They were dismissed on the ground that "mailings required by law to be
made can only be viewed as in furtherance of a scheme prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 1341
where the mailed documents are themselves false or fraudulent," which was not alleged.
Brief for the United States at 5 n.5.
37 Brief for the United States at 9 (quoting indictment).
38 Id. The mail fraud count also alleged that the scheme had the purpose of de-
frauding the citizens of their right to be made aware of all relevant facts when selecting
an insurance agent. The District Court did not instruct on this purpose, holding that it
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the second allegation was clearly proved and was sufficient by itself
to sustain the conviction,3 9 the Court brushed off this point, discuss-
ing the case as if only the first allegation were contained in the in-
dictment. 40  The defendants were convicted of the single
substantive count and the conspiracy count.4 t
Having now been apprised of the facts, the reader may still be
rather uncertain about just where the fraud occurred. Who was de-
frauded of what? If the money did not belong to the State of Ken-
tucky (the government conceded that it did not),42 why were the
citizens of Kentucky defrauded of their right to good government?
What exactly did the defendants do to commit the fraud?43 The
government's brief is vague on this point. It points out that Hunt
and Gray used the $200,000 for personal purposes,44 but this alone
is not fraud. It points out that they "concealed their ownership of
Seton and the fact that it was not a bona fide insurance agency"
from Wombwell, 45 but why is this a fraud against the citizens of
Kentucky? It was not charged that Wombwell was defrauded.
While it is clear that Hunt and Gray were not entitled to the money,
it is not clear who was entitled to it. Had it been clear, the govern-
ment could have charged this as a straightforward fraud against that
victim. 46
In fact, the government's theory (though it never appears ex-
plicitly in its brief), is that Hunt and Gray breached afiduciary duty to
was subsumed in the purpose to deny the right to honest government. McNally v.
United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1987).
39 The government, evidently feeling uneasy about defending the vague "intangible
rights" theory in this case, advanced, as its primary argument, that the Court need not
reach that point because the defendants had also been convicted in the same count, for
obtaining property by false pretenses. Brief for the United States at 16-22.
40 "There was no charge ... that the Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any
money or property .... Although the government now relies in part on the assertion
that the petitioners obtained property by means of false representations to
Wombwell.... There was nothing in the jury charge that required such a finding."
McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882.
41 Id. at 2879.
42 "[Tlhose commissions were not the Commonwealth's money. McNally, 107 S. Ct.
at 2881. "[Tlhere is no charge.., that the Commonwealth itself was defrauded of any
money or property [or] what in the absence of the scheme the Commonwealth would
have paid a lower premium or secured better insurance." Id.
43 "[Tlhe government has never claimed that [Hunt's] directing Wombwell to split
excess commissions with valid insurance agencies not controlled by Hunt and Gray vio-
lated any law." Brief for the United States at 34 n.126.
44 Id. at 4.
45 Id.
46 See infra notes 220-22 and accompanying text arguing that the government could
have designated the class of legitimate insurance agencies as the victim since, had Seton
not gotten the money, it would have been divided in some way among that class.
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disclose their interest in Seton to some, unspecified, person or en-
tity in Kentucky government and, by their silence, defrauded the cit-
izens of good government, despite the fact that Kentucky law
required no such disclosure. 47 Yet it would seem that their behavior
would be no less "fraudulent" if they had told somebody about it, if
only they had known who they were supposed to tell.
The Supreme Court, treating this strictly as a conviction based
on the intangible right to good government,48 recognized that the
statute set forth two different offenses. Schemes "to defraud"
(Clause 1) and schemes "for obtaining money or property by false
pretenses, representations or promises." (Clause 2)4 9 Only Clause
1, the Court assumed, was charged in this case. The courts of ap-
peals had all reasoned that since Clause 1, "to defraud," did not
mention money or property, it was not necessary that these be the
object of such a scheme. Thus deprivation of intangible rights to
good government, loyal services, etc., had been recognized as ob-
jects of fraud.50
However, the Supreme Court observed, quite correctly5 that
the term "fraud" itself, both in its original understanding and, ap-
parently, in Congress' understanding at the time of the enactment
of the mail fraud statute in 1872 and its amendment in 1909,52 con-
templated" 'wronging one in his property rights by dishonest meth-
ods or schemes.' -53 Clause 2 had been added in 1909,54 not to
create a new crime of deprivation of money or property, but to
47 This theory of the government's case is helpfully supplied by the Supreme Court
in footnote 9 of its opinion. McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 n.9 (1987).
It does not appear in the government's brief. The indictment simply charged that the
citizens of Kentucky were defrauded of their "right to be made aware of all relevant and
pertinent facts and circumstances when selecting an insurance agent" without specifying
which misrepresentations (or failures to disclose) by the defendants had constituted the
fraud. Id. at 2879 n.4.
48 "Although the Government now relies in part on the assertion that the petitioners
obtained property by means of false representations to Wombwell .... there was noth-
ing in the jury charge that required such a finding." Id. at 2882.
49 Id. at 2881.
50 Id. at 2881. See also cases listed in footnotes 2-4 ofJustice Steven's dissent. Id. at
2887 nn.2-4 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
51 See infra notes 126-29 and accompanying text. See also Goldstein, Conspiracy to De-
fraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 420 (1959)(noting the common law understand-
ing that fraud was limited to "money or property").
52 17 Stat. 302 and 323 (1872). The original statute referred only to schemes to
defraud, not mentioning "obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses,
etc."
53 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 (quoting Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S.
182, 188 (1929)).
54 35 Stat. 1130 (1909).
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"codify" the holding of Durland v. United States in 189655 that the
schemes to defraud prohibited by the mail fraud statute were not
limited to "false pretenses" as that term was then understood 56 such
as representations as to past or present facts but included represen-
tations as to the future. 57
This Article will argue later 58 that to write off the language "or
for obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses, repre-
sentations, or promises" as merely a codification of Durland, is to ig-
nore the clear meaning of the words. Nevertheless, there is
certainly nothing on the face of the statute or anywhere in the legis-
lative history of either the original 1872 enactment or the 1909
amendment to suggest that Congress contemplated the criminaliza-
tion of schemes that were not aimed at either money or property.59
The 1909 addition of the phrase referring to money or property
simply reflected Congress' understanding that money or property
were necessarily a part of schemes to defraud. There is no basis for
the assumption that the specific reference to money or property in
Clause 2 was meant to expand the concept of "defraud" in Clause 1
to include non-property interests.
Having thus discerned the purpose of the statute, the Court ap-
plied the rule of lenity to choose the narrower reading limiting it to
schemes aimed at money or property, which reading comported
with Congress' apparent purpose and was consistent with the tradi-
tional understanding of "scheme to defraud." 60
In reversing the courts of appeals reliance on the intangible
rights theory, the Court seemed to be holding that only tangible
55 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
56 Wrongly, as it turns out, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
57 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 n.7. This information about the meager legislative
history of the 1909 revision, which was limited to a note in the margin of a 1901 Senate
report, is found in Pearce, Theft by False Promises, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 980 n.56 (1953).
58 See infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text.
59 For example, the sponsor of the legislation, Representative Farnsworth, suggested
that it was "to prevent the frauds, which are mostly gotten up in the large cities... by
thieves, forgers and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the
innocent people of this country." CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 3d Sess. 35 (1870) (state-
ment of Rep. Farnsworth). He then went on to describe such schemes, all of which
involved cheating people out of money. Id. See Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute
(Part I), 18 DuQ.. L. REV. 771, 816-817 (1980), and Note, The Intangible Rights Doctrine and
Political Corruption Prosecutions Under the Federal Mail Fraud Statute, 47 U. CHi. L. REV. 562,
569-572 (1980), for a full discussion of the 1909 amendment.
It is, however, true, as Justice Stevens argued, dissenting in McNally, that the read-
ing that the courts of appeals had given the statute, is a permissible one, given the statu-
tory language. McNally, 197 S. Ct. at 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
60 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 (citing United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971);
United States v. Universal CIT Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-222 (1952)).
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property could be the object of a fraud. Indeed, the lower court in
McNally had expressly distinguished between the "intangible right,
such as honest service [and] a scheme to obtain tangible property
through fraud."' 61 Certainly, it was such tangible property that Con-
gress was concerned with when the statute was enacted. 62 The
Supreme Court even observed that Haas v. Henkel,63 in which the
Court had upheld a conviction for conspiracy to defraud the govern-
ment for the bribing of a government official to make advance dis-
closure of a cotton crop report, was inapplicable. 64 That statute,
which prohibited conspiracy to defraud the United States, 65 pro-
tected different interests ("the protection and welfare of the govern-
ment" 66) than the mail fraud statute (protection of "individual
property rights"). 67 Thus, McNally definitely indicated that disclo-
sure of the confidential information of a private business, as op-
posed to the government, would not involve deprivation of a
"property right" punishable under section 1341.68 However,
whatever the McNally dictum may have suggested, Carpenter made it
clear that "property" included intangible interests such as a business'
right to confidential information and that the relevant question is
not, "was the object of the fraud tangible or intangible?" but "was it
property, including intangible property, or not?" 69 The meaning of
this enigmatic distinction is far from clear and will be the subject of
discussion later in this Article.
Justice Stevens, in a forceful dissent in McNally, pointed out the
unanimity of the courts of appeals in supporting the intangible
rights theory, disagreed with the majority's reading of the original
purpose of Congress 70 and argued that, whatever the original pur-
61 United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290, 1295 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting United States
v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1984)).
62 See supra note 59.
63 216 U.S. 462 (1910).
64 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 n.8 (1987).
65 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1982).
66 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881 n.8.
67 Id. While Henkel was a "strained extension", Goldstein, supra note 4 1, at 426, of
the concept of fraud, the Court does seem to have accurately stated the rationale of the
case. Id.
68 Thus "fraud" in the Conspiracy to Defraud the Government statute means some-
thing different than "fraud" in the mail fraud statute.
69 See infra note 93.
70 Justice Steven's argument from history is not convincing. See infra notes 220-23
and accompanying text. In particular, Justice Stevens gives the following example from
an 1809 British case. "A, a commissary-general of stores in the West Indies makes
contracts with B to supply the stores on the condition that B should divide the profits
with A." McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2887 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Contrary to Justice Stevens' assertion, A has here defrauded his employer, not only
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pose of Congress in 1872, the Court should not be bound by it to-
day, given that the terms of the statute supported the intangible
rights approach. 71
Why did the Court, which has so often taken a very expansive
view of federal powers under the Constitution and federal criminal
statutes, 72 adopt this "crabbed construction"73 of the mail fraud
statute? Because, in the Court's view, to uphold the conviction in
this case would have been to "construe the statute in a manner that
leaves its outer boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal
Government in setting standards of disclosure and good govern-
ment for state and local officials." 74 As will be discussed, by requir-
ing that a "property" interest, albeit, as clarified in Carpenter, not
necessarily a tangible property interest, be involved, the Court,
while not choosing the best line of reasoning available, has never-
theless gone far toward eliminating many of the problems of over-
breadth that had led to strong criticism of the mail fraud statute as it
had been applied. 75
Another point must be made about McNally. The Court ac-
cepted, at least arguendo, the theory advanced successfully by the
Government in the Second Circuit in United States v. Margiotta.76
In Margiotta, a case with facts remarkably similar to McNally, the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals held that if a person exercises the
powers of a government official, he owes the same duties to the pub-
of his loyal services, but also of money. Since B was willing to supply the stores for half
the profit ostensibly received (the other half having gone to A), A could have negotiated
the contract at a lower price that reflected that reduced profit. Thus, A has defrauded
his employer of the price increase that was necessary to pay kickbacks to himself.
71 Id. at 2882-86 (Stevens, J. dissenting).
72 See, e.g., Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. GRIM. L. REV.
213 (1985)(discussing the Court's broad interpretation of federal powers under the
commerce clause and under various federal criminal statutes).
73 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 2881.
75 See Coffee, The Metastasis of Mail Fraud- The Continuing Story of the Evolution of a White
Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983)[hereinafter Coffee, Metastasis]; Hurson, Limit-
ing the Mail Fraud Statute - A Legislative Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423 (1982); Cof-
fee, From Tort to Crime: Some Reflections on the Criminalization of Fiduciary Breaches and the
Problematic Line Between Law and Ethics, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 117 (198 1)[hereinafter Cof-
fee, Tort to Crime]; United States v. Weiss, 752 F.2d 777, 791 (2d Cir. 1984)(Newman, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985); United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108,
140 (2d Cir. 1982)(Winter, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913 (1983).
76 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982). Like Mr. Hunt, Mr. Margiotta was a political boss
who received a secret share of insurance commissions kicked back from the govern-
ment's insurers for political patronage purposes. Id. at 114. The only difference is that
Margiotta, unlike Hunt, was a licensed insurance broker and consequently had at least a
colorable claim of legality in the receipt of a share of the commissions.
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lic that an actual officeholder does.77 In McNally the Supreme Court
"assume[d] that Hunt, as well as Gray was a state officer."'78 Margi-
otta has been strongly criticized by both Professor Coffee 79 and Mr.
Hurson 80 in leading articles condemning the expansion of the mail
fraud statute. However, that criticism was in the context of the in-
tangible rights theory of prosecution. It seemed particularly unfair,
when the only alleged wrong was breach of a fiduciary duty to "the
citizens," to prosecute a person for such a wrong who didn't even
occupy the formal position of a fiduciary. After McNally, however,
when a person, such as Margiotta or Hunt, is in a position to de-
fraud some victim, be it the government or an individual, of money
or property, the fact that he does not formally hold office should not
be an impediment to prosecution. Once the essence of the crime
becomes deprivation of property rather than breach of fiduciary
duty, the arguable absence of a fiduciary relationship to the victim
becomes irrelevant.
In Carpenter,8' a case that the Court agreed to hear well before
the McNally decision was rendered,82 the Court, as noted, unani-
mously made it clear that "property" for the purposes of mail fraud,
was not limited to tangible property. In that case, petitioner Winans
was a reporter for the Wall Street Journal who wrote the "Heard on
the Street" column.8 3 He had recognized that, when that column
77 Id. at 122.
78 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
79 Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 75, at 15 ("Margiotta expanded the scope of the cov-
ered behavior to include not only excessive zeal in helping one's friends and business
associates but also one's political party or presumably any other interest group one
serves.... Margiotta... can be read to include ideological conflicts of interest as opposed
to simple economic ones.").
Margiotta also personally profitted from this scheme, but that was not, apparently,
essential to the "intangible rights" theory of the government's case. Margiotta, 688 F.2d
at 114.
80 Hurson, supra note 75, at 439.
If a jury finds that a defendant has a substantial influence in government, a convic-
tion for mail fraud will follow from the mere establishment of a failure to disclose
some piece of material information and the mailing of a letter .... [T]he Second
Circuit in Margiotta opened the door for criminal prosecution of almost anyone
playing a role in the political process who merits the prosecution's disfavor.
Id. See also Jeffries, Legality, Vagueness and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv.
189, 234-242 (1985).
81 Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987).
82 Certiorari was granted in McNally on December 6, 1986, 479 U.S. 1005 (1986),
and in Carpenter on December 15, 1986, 479 U.S. 1016 (1986). Perhaps it was the
Court's original intent to strengthen McNally by applying it to insider trading cases,
rather than to decide Carpenter in a way that directly contradicted the McNally footnote as
to the meaning of "property," see infra note 92-93, and thereby substantially undercut
the McNally holding.
83 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 318-19.
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reported favorably on a company, that company's stock tended to
increase in price. Consequently, he entered into an agreement with
petitioner Felis and one Peter Brand, stockbrokers, to trade on this
knowledge. 84 This was in violation of specific Wall Street Journal em-
ployment guidelines. In all, the scheme netted the participants
about $690,000.85 Winans and Felis were convicted of securities,
mail and wire fraud and conspiracy. Carpenter was convicted of aid-
ing and abetting.8 6
The government, not anticipating the McNally holding, did not
argue that the Wall Street Journal was deprived of "property" in its
original brief.87 Rather the government's brief focused on whether
Winan's abuse of his position of trust with the Journal was sufficient
to constitute "fraud," and whether the publication of the Journal,
which required use of the mails and interstate wires, was enough to
satisfy the mailing requirements.
The Court had "little trouble" 88 deciding these issues. As to
the first, it quoted the New York Court of Appeals to the effect that
exploitation of confidential information acquired "by virtue of a
confidential or fiduciary relationship with another" is a breach of
fiduciary duty and that such a breach is an aspect of fraud.89 As to
the second point, the Court observed that "circulation of the
'Heard' column was not only anticipated but an essential part of the
scheme." 90 Consequently the mailings and wirings associated with
that circulation could be charged to the defendants.
The third issue decided in Carpenter was raised by the McNally
decision: Assuming that the misuse of the confidential publication
schedule and contents of the "Heard" column may be "trick, deceit,
chicane or overreaching" as McNally required,9' was there a depri-
vation of "property" under McNally? As previously discussed, 92 Mc-
Nally seemed to suggest that the crucial distinction was between
tangible property and intangible interests which were not "prop-
84 Petitioner Carpenter was Winans' roommate. He was aware of the scheme and
received some of the profits from it. Brief for the United States at 6, Carpenter v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 316 (1987)(No. 86-422).
85 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 319.
86 Id. at 318
87 This issue was addressed in a Supplemental Brief. Supplemental Brief for the
United States, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 316 (No. 86-422).
88 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 321.
89 Id. at 321-22 (quoting Diamond v. Oremuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494,497, 248 N.E.2d 910,
912, 301 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (1969)).
90 Id. at 322. That is, if the stock was to rise in price, potential buyers had to read
about the company in the Journal.
91 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 (1987).
92 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
1988] 585
CRAIG M. BRADLEY
erty," the latter not being subject to the mail fraud statute. In Car-
penter, the Court made it clear that certain intangible interests,
including "confidential business information" are "property" under
the terms of the statute.93 It reaffirmed McNally, however, by hold-
ing that the Journal's "contractual right to [Winan's] honest and
faithful service" was "too ethereal in itself to fall within the mail
fraud statute."'94 The issue thus posed, where to draw the line be-
tween those intangible rights that are and are not "property," will
be discussed later in the Article.95
The scheme prosecuted in Carpenter does not seem quite as
much a cotton candy crime as that in McNally. Here, at least, there is
an identifiable victim who was, in a sense, tricked or misled by the
scheme. Still, there are problems when this case is compared to a
classic fraud in which the victim is tricked into giving his or her
money or property to the defrauder.
First, there was arguably no "trick, chicane, deceit or overreach-
ing" which, as the Court recognized in McNally,96 is an element of
fraud. Winans neither lied nor gave a false impression by his con-
duct. He did, however, breach a fiduciary duty not to disclose confi-
dential information and a further duty to disclose such breaches to
his employer and, in doing so, caused potential harm to the em-
ployer. This has long been recognized as satisfying the "deceit" ele-
ment of a fraud.97
Second, it is not clear how the Journal was deprived of "prop-
erty" here. As the case was originally tried by the government, the
fraudulent behavior was the failure to disclose the breach and the
harm to the victim was the loss of the Journal's intangible right to the
honest and faithful services of its employee. After McNally, the gov-
ernment filed a supplemental brief urging that the fraudulent behav-
ior was the embezzlement of confidential information and the harm
was the loss of the exclusive use of that information.98 The Court
93 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 320.
94 Id.
95 See infra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
96 McAlally, 107 S. Ct. at 2881.
97 E.g., Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910); Goldstein, supra note 51, at 425-27. It
has long been recognized that conduct alone may constitute fraud. For example, the
wearing of the dress of an Oxford student in order to obtain credit at local stores was
held to be a false pretense. Rex v. Barnard, 173 Eng. Rep. 342 (1837). Mere silence,
even when it does not constitute an affirmation, as in Barnard, will suffice if the defend-
ant stands in a fiduciary relationship to the victim. 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTt, SUBSTAN-
TIVE CRIMINAL LAw § 8.7(b)(3) (1986).
98 Petitioners used this misimpression [that Winans was a faithful employee] and
Winans' position of trust to gain access to a continuing flow of confidential informa-
tion. That flow started because Winans made at least implicit representations of
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adopted this latter theory, 99 endeavoring to conform to the "prop-
erty" limitation of McNally.
By holding that "the concept of fraud includes the act of em-
bezzlement"' 0 0 the Court ignored the very history of fraud that it
had relied on in McNally. On the contrary, the crime of fraud had
always been understood by both Congress' 0 1 and the Supreme
Court10 2 as proscribing only the fraud of false pretenses,10 3 rather
than any crime that involved "fraudulent" behavior, which crimes
included larceny, embezzlement, forgery, and larceny by trick as
well as false pretenses.,0 4 According to the Court's holding in Car-
penter, any employee who helps himself to money or property which
his or her employer has entrusted to him or her is now guilty of the
federal offense of wire or mail fraud if only the mails or wires are
used or caused to be used in some way. The Congress that enacted
this statute would surely have been surprised at this declaration.' 0 5
loyalty at the outset of his employment, and continued because Winans failed to
disabuse the Journal of its mistaken belief [that he was still loyal] and to comply with
his specific duty to disclose leaks of the Heard column.
Brief for the United States at 10, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316.
By contrast to this "failure to disclose" theory, the government urged in its Supple-
mental Brief that the crime was misappropriation of confidential information. Supple-
mental Brief for the United States at 1-2. Obviously failure to disclose has nothing to do
with this crime-it occurs as soon as the information is misappropriated, whether or not
the defendant reports that dereliction. Id.
99 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 321. The indictment, which was 21 pages long, included
both of these theories. Joint Appendix at 1-21.
100 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 321.
101 See supra note 59 for a discussion of section 1341's legislative history. "The typical
false pretenses statute is almost identical to section 1341 as amended in 1909." Note,
supra note 59, at 573-74.
102 Note, supra note 59, at 573-74 (citing Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306
(1896)).
103 Id. ("The mail fraud statute should properly be interpreted as prohibiting [only]
the fraud of false pretenses.").
104 E.g., 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1154 ("[T]aking... need not be secret but
must be fraudulent."). See Note, supra note 49, at 573 ("Crimes of fraud have generally
been regarded as crimes against property involving some form of trickery or deception
[including] embezzlement, false pretenses, forgery and larceny by trick." (citing 1 J.
BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 565-590 (7th ed. 1882))).
105 The Court's holding that Winans' misappropriation of the information was an
"embezzlement" reflects the difficulty of the government's position. The government
changed its mind about whether the fraud occurred when Winansfirst took information
(the embezzlement theory) or when he failed to disclose his use of the information (the
false pretenses theory). Compare Brief for the United States at 13 ("he foster[ed] and
maintain[ed] a misimpression that afford(ed) him access to his employer's confidential
information") with Supplemental Brief for the United States at 1 ("petitioners' convic-
tions were based squarely on their fraudulent misappropriation of proprietary informa-
tion"). Presumably the Court adopted the latter "embezzlement" approach because the
false pretenses approach suggested that if Winans had taken information once and then
told the Journal about it, he wouldn't have violated the statute. This "every criminal gets
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But while it was an overstatement by the Court to suggest that
any embezzlement is a "fraud," it is fair to say that Winans' acts
constituted "fraud," whether they are characterized as "embezzle-
ment" or "false pretenses." The difficulty arises because neither of
these traditional crimes were defined in terms of intangible prop-
erty. On the one hand, this looks like an embezzlement because Wi-
nans was entrusted with the Journal's information and he took it for
his own use.' 06 However, embezzlement requires a conversion, that
is, "a serious act of interference with the owner's rights."' 10 7
Though Winans used the information himself, he did not substan-
tially interfere with the Journal's use of it. It is also not strictly false
pretenses. While Winans' conduct in holding himself out as a loyal
employee may be sufficient to satisfy the "false representation" ele-
ment t0 8 he certainly didn't acquire title to the information and thus,
one of the traditional elements of false pretenses' 09 is missing.
Once intangibles are recognized as being the proper subjects of a
fraud, however, as Carpenter held, it would make no sense to find no
fraud simply because the object of the offense did not have the tradi-
tional characteristics of tangible property. Intangibles, such as in-
formation, can be used by the defendant without being converted
and without title passing. The Court should have recognized Wi-
nans' behavior as involving the kind of deceitful behavior tradition-
ally encompassed by the concept of "false pretenses," not
"embezzlement," and consequently as falling within the fraud stat-
one bite" result was, obviously, a distasteful one. The Court would have been better off
to have simply held that Winans' misappropriation was the kind of deceitful behavior
that fraud has always been concerned with, rather than characterizing Winans' acts as an
"embezzlement."
106 2 W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-rr, supra note 97, § 8.6. Embezzlement is "(1) the fraudu-
lent (2) conversion of (3) the property (4) of another (5) by one who is already in posses-
sion of it." Id.
107 Id. However:
some modern embezzlement statutes go so far as to penalize breach of faith without
regard to whether anything is misappropriated. Thus, the fiduciary who makes for-
bidden investments [and] the official who deposits public funds in an unauthorized
depository... may be designated an embezzler. Although this kind of coverage is
relatively new for Anglo-American penal law, certain foreign codes have long recog-
nized criminal "breach of trust" as a distrust entity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.1, commentary at 129 (1980).
108 "There may... be a duty to speak to correct a misapprehension.., as where [the
defendant] stands in a fiduciary relationship to the [victim]." 2 W. LAFAvE & A. Sco-rt,
supra note 97, § 8.7(b)(3).
109 False pretenses is "(1) a false representation of a material past or present fact (2)
which causes the victim (3) to pass title [of] (4) his property to the wrongdoer (5) who (a)
knows his representation to be false and (b) intends thereby to defraud the victim." Id.
at § 8.7.
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ute. The remaining question then, is whether the Court was correct
in holding that "property" in that statute includes intangibles.
The Court simply held, without any pertinent authority, that
deprivation of the right to exclusive use of confidential information
impinges on a "property" interest. 1 0 Certainly this too was incon-
sistent with the historic understanding of fraud that had informed
the McNally decision. Contrary to Carpenter, the legislative history as
well as the general understanding of "fraud" at the time of the en-
actment of the mail fraud statute suggests that "fraud" was limited
to money or tangible property, as discussed below.
While courts use the term "common law" to refer to the early
law of fraud,"' in fact, that law is largely statutory. The common
law punished only those cheats that were "effected by deceitful to-
kens or symbols which may affect the public at large and against
which common prudence could not have guarded."' "12
The American law of false pretenses or fraud is based on the
1757 statute of 30 Geo II, ch. 24" t 3 which forbade: "Knowingly and
designedly, by false pretense or pretenses, obtain(ing) from any per-
son or persons money, goods, wares or merchandise with intent to
cheat or defraud any person or persons of the same. ... " 114
The original mail fraud statute, enacted in 1872, provided
That if any person having devised or intending to devise any scheme
or artifice to defraud, to be effected by either opening or intending to
open correspondence or communication with any other person
(whether resident within or outside the United States), by means of the
post-office establishment of the United States, or by inciting such
other person to open communication with the person so devising or
intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or at-
tempting so to do), place any letter or packet in any post-office of the
United States, or take or receive any therefrom, such person, so misus-
110 Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
111 In McNally, the Court rejected "the argument that the statute reaches only such
cases as, at common law, would come within the reach of 'false pretenses.' " McNally v.
United States, 108 S. Ct. 2875, 2879 (1987)(quoting United States v. Durland, 161 U.S.
306, 312 (1896)).
112 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw § 1380 (12th ed. 1932). Thus it was a common law
crime to sell by false weight or measure or to sell clothing with a forged label. Id. at
§ 1382. "The cases in which fraud is indictable at common law, seem confined to the
use of false weights and measures-the selling of goods with counterfeit marks, playing
with false dice-and frauds affecting the course ofjustice and immediately injuring the
interests of the public or crown." J. CHrr, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE COMMON
LAw 995 (1816).
113 F. WHARTON, supra note 112, § 1395 n.1 I (referring to this as "the original from
which most of our [American] statutes are drawn"). Accord Pearce, supra note 57, at 968
n.6.
114 F. WHARTON, supra note 112, § 1395 n.1l (quoting 30 Geo. II, ch. 24 (1757)).
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ing the post-office establishment shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.' 15
In 1896 in the Durland case, 1 16 the Supreme Court held that the
phrase "scheme or artifice to defraud" was not limited to schemes
punishable at "common law" such as those involving representa-
tions as to past or present fact 1 7 but included "representations and
promises as to the future.""t 8 In 1909, Congress, in an apparent
effort to codify Durland,119 added the language of Clause 2, "or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pre-
tenses, representations or promises" to the statute. 120
It is clear that, while Durland may have charted a prudential
course in divorcing the term "defraud" in the mail fraud statute
from the common (albeit incorrect) 12 1 American understanding of
"false pretenses," the terms did not in fact have any different mean-
ing in this context. Thus, the Durland Court was wrong in giving a
criminal statute a meaning clearly not contemplated by Congress. 122
As discussed, "fraud" was a broader term applied to other crimes of
deception, such as embezzlement, as well as to false pretenses, 12 3
but in the mail fraud statute the term "fraud" meant, essentially,
"false pretenses" and the Durland Court did not change that, except
115 Act ofJune 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 301, 17 Stat. 323. See Rakoff, supra note 59, at 779-
86 for an excellent discussion of the history of this statute.
Note the presence of an additional element compared to the current statute. That is
that the scheme "be effected by opening... correspondence ... by means of the post
office establishment of the United States." This "mail emphasizing" language explains
the concept, still extant today, that the misuse of the mails is the "gist" or essence of the
mail fraud statute-a concept that is no larger justified by the statutory language.
Rakoff, supra note 59, at 821-22.
116 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
117 In fact, this was a widespread, but erroneous view of the 18th century British law
of fraud.
118 Durland, 161 U.S. at 313.
119 Pearce, supra note 57, at 980. The addition of Clause 2 "was in the Code submit-
ted by the Commission appointed to prepare a draft. There was no comment on this
change other than the citation of Durland v. United States in the margin of the Commis-
sion's report." Id. at 981 n.56.
120 35 Stat. 1130 (1909). Congress also eliminated the mail-emphasizing language, as
well as other language, added in 1889, Act of March 2, 1889 Ch. 393 § 1, 25 Stat. 873,
that had listed specific types of frauds such as "sawdust swindle" and "counterfeit
money fraud."
121 As Professor Pearce has demonstrated, the British understanding of false pre-
tenses in the 1757 statute was not limited to representations as to past or present facts
but included false promises as to the future as to which the promisor had no intention of
fulfilling his promises. Pearce, supra note 57, at 979. Wharton is responsible for the
contrary American understanding, apparently based on his reading of the British cases
in the first edition of his Criminal Law which appeared in 1846. Id. at 968.
122 See infra note 272.
123 Note, supra note 59, at 573 and sources cited therein.
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in one particular. 124 As the Durland Court admitted, it was going
"beyond the letter of the statute" to reach "the evil sought to be
remedied."1 25
As Professor Pearce observed, "The Court interpreted the stat-
ute as essentially a false pretense statute but simply refused to ac-
cept the restriction [as to representations of past or present
fact.]"1 26
Having determined that "fraud" and "false pretenses" de-
scribed the same crime, the question now becomes whether that
crime was limited to tangible property. The answer, at the time the
mail fraud statute was enacted was certainly yes: "A false pretense
... induces a party to whom it is made to part with his property....
A mere pecuniary advantage, devoid of any physical attribute pos-
sessed by money, chattels, or valuable securities is not within a stat-
ute as to false pretenses."' 127
Thus, in terms of the common understanding of the crime of
fraud or false pretenses at the time of the original 1872 statute and
the 1909 amendment, it is clear, that the concept of "defraud" was
limited to tangible property.
It is thus apparent that while history supported the Court's
holding in McNally, limiting "fraud" to money or property, it did
not support Carpenter's extension of "property" to include such in-
tangibles as confidential information.
Indeed, prior to McNally, the lower courts had all assumed that
"property" meant "tangible property" but that, because Clause l's
"scheme to defraud" did not mention "money or property," Clause
1 also embraced schemes to deprive victims of such intangibles as
the right to honest services, reputation, information, and the like. 128
124 "[The mail fraud statute should be properly interpreted as proscribing the fraud
of false pretenses." Id.
125 Durland v. United States, 161 U.S. 306, 313 (1896).
126 Pearce, supra note 57, at 979.
127 F. WHARTON, supra note 112, § 1399 n.18. AccordJ. CHrrrY, supra note 112, at 998.
Obtaining an extension of time in which to pay a loan is not considered "property." F.
WHARTON, supra.
128 See, e.g., United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1986), rev'd sub noma. United
States v. McNally, 107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987). In Gray, the Court quoted the Seventh
Circuit:
A scheme to defraud the citizenry and government of an intangible right, such as
honest service, can be contrasted with a scheme to obtain tangible property through
fraud. A scheme to obtain tangible property is cognizable under the mail fraud
statute regardless of the relationship between the defendant and his victim. In con-
trast, an intangible rights scheme is only cognizable when at least one of the
schemes has a fiduciary relationship with the defrauded person or entity.
Id. at 1294-95 (quoting United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1984)).
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Once the Court limited mail fraud to money or property, it was rea-
sonable to assume that intangibles were not included.
Furthermore, once it is recognized that the term "defraud" im-
plied a deprivation of tangible property, the fact, as the Court ob-
served in Carpenter, that "confidential business information has long
been recognized as property"'129 in other contexts is irrevelant.
Whether or not confidential information had long been regarded as
"property," it and other intangibles, such as a business' reputation,
had not long been recognized, and certainly were not recognized in
1872 and 1909, as covered by a statute prohibiting "fraud."
The Court put itself in a box in McNally from which it could
only escape, in Carpenter, by a gross distortion of the historical evi-
dence on which McNally had been based. A far better approach
would have been to have recognized the problem in McNally as be-
ing the lack of an identifiable victim who suffered economic harm, 130
rather than holding that a traditional view of "property" was an es-
sential element of fraud. Then, in Carpenter, it could have noted the
presence of a specific victim and a potential economic loss to that
victim as satisfying the McNally requirement. In response to the ar-
gument that "fraud" traditionally required a deprivation of tangible
property, the Court in Carpenter, not constrained by a contrary reli-
ance on history in McNally, could simply have agreed with this point
but held, forthrightly, that, in this information age much that is in-
tangible is just as valuable as tangible property.13 ' The key question
129 Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987). For example, the Court
cited Board of Trade of Chicago v. Christie Grain Co., 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1905),
which held that confidential information compiled by plaintiff Board of Trade is prop-
erty, and it is entitled to keep that information secret. Nothing in any of the cases cited
by the Court deals with the coverage of the crime of fraud. The best case would have
been Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 479-80 (1910), in which the Court had held that
conspiracy to defraud the government embraced a theft of information and did not re-
quire an "actual financial or property loss." However, as discussed supra notes 14-26,
the Court had already closed this door in McNally by holding that the statute interpreted
in Henkel, protecting, as it did, the operations of government, should be read more
broadly than the mail fraud statute which only protected the "individual property rights
of the members of the civic body." McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880 n.8. Historically speak-
ing, given the language of the Henkel decision, the Court was surely correct not to extend
this "strained extension of the word defraud,' " Goldstein, supra note 51, at 462, to pri-
vate frauds in McNally. However, in Carpenter it did precisely what it had refused to do in
McNally.
130 Accord United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758 (7th Cir. 1983) and cases cited
therein.
131 This is a description of how the Court could have reached the result it desired in
Carpenter. It is not how I would have interpreted the statute, believing that criminal
statutes should be construed according to their ordinary meaning at the time of drafting
(as best as can be determined). See infra notes 272-74 and accompanying text. However,
as Professor Jeffries has recognized, one of the most important tasks of courts in inter-
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is not what kind of property was involved but whether there was an
economic loss to an identifiable victim as well as an unjust gain to
the defendant.' 3 2 As will be argued, while this is not precisely what
the Court said, this line of reasoning is the only way to explain what
it did, in McNally and Carpenter.
Prior to McNally, the lower courts, while not focusing carefully
on this issue, had offered divergent views as to whether an unjust
gain and/or a loss to the victim is required. Under the "intangible
rights" approach, the courts sometimes seemed to require neither,
as Professor Coffee explained:
Under the "intangible rights" doctrine, a public or private fiduciary
can be prosecuted on the theory that this conduct has deprived his
beneficiaries of their right to his "honest and faithful services" [by
non-disclosure of a conflict of interest). [T]he operative effect of this
disclosure requirement is to simplify the prosecutor's case by substi-
tuting proof of non-disclosure for proof of loss or illicit gain. l33
However, sometimes courts have required at least proof of one
or the other, as illustrated by the district court's opinion in Carpenter.
The court quoted Devitt and Blackmar's Federal Jury Practice and In-
structions to the effect that "intent to defraud" means to act with the
purpose of " 'either causing some financial loss to another, or bring-
ing about some financial gain to oneself.' "134
Yet another approach was taken by the Second Circuit in United
States v. Dixon. 13 5 In Dixon the Court distinguished between corrup-
preting statutes is to "make the law more.., certain." Jeffries, supra note 80, at 220. If
the Court had forthrightly declared that it was departing from the common law in in-
cluding intangible property, at least it would have taken an honest approach. By claim-
ing to adhere to traditional understanding while at the same time departing from it, the
Court has sacrificed future certainty for present results. See also Bradley, The Uncertainty
Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DuKE LJ. I (1986)(discussing the Court's repeated
tendency to do this).
132 This latter point is generally assumed by the courts since, in the cases prosecuted,
it is almost invariably present. But see United States v. Baldinger, 838 F.2d 176 (6th Cir.
1988).
133 Coffee, Metastasis, supra note 75, at 1-2. In United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347,
aff'd in part, 602 F.2d. 653 (4th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980), the court
noted that the case could have been submitted to the jury simply on the theory that
Governor Mandel had been bribed or that "false information was presented to, or this
information concealed from the Maryland General Assembly... in order to induce...
favorable action toward those interested in [the racetrack involved in the scheme]." Id.
at 1364. No proof was advanced that the Governor "had a direct interest in the race-
track business." Id. See also Feldman, 711 F.2d at 763 and cases cited therein (economic
harm to a victim was required).
134 United States v. Winans, 612 F. Supp 827, 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)(quoting 2 E.
DEvrrT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 47.08 (3d ed.
1977)(emphasis added)). This alternative approach is reflected in Hurson's proposed
statute. Hurson, supra note 75, at 457.
135 536 F.2d 1388 (2d Cir. 1976).
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tion of public official cases, in which there need only be an unjust
gain, and private delicts, in which there must be both a gain to the
defendant and harm to the victim.' 3 6 In the former case, even if the
public fisc is enriched, it is a fraud "since the public official has been
paid [i.e., bribed] to act in breach of his duties."13 7
If history is to be the guide, then it is quite clear that, for a fraud
to occur, there must be both a gain and a loss. As one commentator
has observed, "[d]uring the period of enactment and critical amend-
ment of the mail fraud statute, it was impossible to obtain a convic-
tion for false pretenses unless the defendant had directly received
something of economic value from the victim.' 3 8
That is, as previously discussed, Congress almost surely con-
templated a classic fraud in which the victim is induced by false rep-
resentations to hand over money or tangible property to the
defendant and the victim's loss is the defendant's gain. Under this
approach, even assuming that confidential, information counts as
"property," Carpenter would not be a fraud case because Winans'
gain-insider trading profits-was not the Journal's loss-the confi-
dentiality of its information.139
136 Id. at 1400.
137 Id. The court does not explain why this reasoning would not apply equally to a
private employee who is paid to act in breach of his or her duties.
Accord United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied sub
nom., Kerner v. United States, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)(holding that the defendant could be
prosecuted for breach of the public trust, even though the public had profitted from the
scheme). Isaacs, in turn, relied on Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110 (5th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941). "No trustee has more sacred duties than a public
official and any scheme to obtain an advantage by corrupting such an [sic.] one must in
the federal law be considered a scheme to defraud." Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1150 (quoting
Shushan, 117 F.2d at 115 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 574 (1941)).
In Isaacs, the Court discussed United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973) with approval. That case involved kickbacks to a private
employee, suggesting that the Seventh Circuit did not draw the same distinction be-
tween private and public employees as did the Second Circuit.
There is support for the notion that a victim need not be specified if the fraud is
against the public because, as Wharton points out, "it is the essence of the common law
cheat that it should be addressed to the public generally." F. WHARTON, supra note 112,
§ 1393 ("Indictment for public cheats need not name party cheated"). This was the
distinction drawn between private and public frauds in McNally v. United States, 107 S.
Ct. 2875, 2880 n.8 (1987).
138 Note, supra note 59, at 574. The Note discusses at length the American and Eng-
lish cases from the 19th and early 20th centuries. Accord United States v. Runnels, 833
F.2d 1183, 1185 (6th Cir. 1987)("Criminal liability for false pretenses, which the mail
fraud statute was intended to reach, was consistently predicated upon the defendant's
taking of some economic benefit from the scheme's victim" at the time the statute was
enacted.); F. WHARTON, supra note 112, § 1465 ("[t]hing obtained must be of same
value").
139 The government could not have argued in Carpenter that Winans' gain was simply
the confidential information. He already had that information as part of his job. It was
[Vol. 79
THE ESSENCE OF MAIL FRAUD
McNally and Carpenter thus are inconsistent with each other, one
relying on, and the other ignoring, history. The only way to come
close to reconciling the two decisions is to recognize this as the
Court's purpose: to force the prosecution to clearly identify the victim, and
to define, in economic terms, what he or she stood to lose and what the defend-
ant stood to gain. In McNally, the Court focused on the need to prove
loss, requiring the "deprivation of something of value by trick, de-
ceit, chicane, or overreaching."'' 40 In Carpenter, while first making it
clear that deprivation of the exclusive use of information was suffi-
cient to satisfy the "property loss" requirement' 4 ' (as opposed to
actual monetary loss), the Court went on to focus on Winans'
"scheme to share profits from trading in anticipation of the
"Heard" column's impact on the stock market"'142 and to recognize
that Winans was "not free to exploit [confidential] information for
his own personal benefit."' 43 That is, the Court found the antici-
pated gain a crucial aspect of the scheme. Thus, McNally and Carpen-
ter, read together, require an economic gain to the defendant and loss
to the victim (or the prospect of same) but do not require that this
gain and loss be of "property" as that term had been understood by
Congress.
In its brief in Carpenter, the government agreed that both gain
and loss are necessary: "[A] scheme to use a private fiduciary posi-
tion to obtain direct pecuniary gain is within the mail fraud statute,
at least where that scheme contemplates some sort of harm to the
victim."1'44
In the recent, post-McNally case, United States v. Baldinger,'45 the
Sixth Circuit also read McNally in this way, holding that the Supreme
Court had limited the mail fraud statute to schemes "that have as
their goal the transfer of something of economic value to the
defendant."146
In Baldinger, the court was presented with the factual situation
described in Case 1 at the beginning of this Article. The defendant,
with no expectation of gain, set out to ruin another person in his
the trading on the information that was the fraud. Had he traded on this information
without disclosing it to anybody he would have been equally guilty.
140 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2880.
141 Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Brief for the United States at 19, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316 (quoting United States v.
Dixon, 536 F.2d 1388, 1399-1400 (2d Cir. 1976)).
145 838 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1988).
146 Id. at 180.
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business. 47 Despite the fact that the victim clearly stood to suffer
tangible property loss, the court reversed the conviction based on
McNally. While this reversal was based in part on the "intangible
rights" language of the indictment, the court went on to hold that a
"proprietary gain ingredient" was necessary to a mail fraud convic-
tion (in addition to the loss).' 48
Had Winans knowingly breached his duty not to disclose confi-
dential information (in which case harm to the Journal's reputation
was surely reasonably foreseeable) but had no intent that he, or any-
one else, would profit from the disclosure, surely there would be no
"fraud." As the government recognized, the essence of fraud is that
the defendant seeks "pecuniary gain." This point will be discussed
further when the appropriate mens rea is considered.
While the Supreme Court in Carpenter correctly assumed that
the potential for gain and loss was inherent in a "scheme to de-
fraud," it incorrectly identified the potential harm in Carpenter. Why
this is so can be illustrated by some examples.
Suppose Winans, home for Sunday dinner, tells his family
about a forthcoming "Heard" column. The Journal has lost the ex-
clusivity of its information but surely no "fraud" has occurred. Why
not? Because there is no real harm to the Journal and no unjust gain
to Winans. Suppose, by contrast, that Winans tells no one about
forthcoming "Heard" columns but trades on his knowledge himself.
Surely this is a fraud after Carpenter, despite the fact that the informa-
tion has gone no further than Winans himself. Why? Because Wi-
nans has experienced an unjust gain and he has subjected the Journal
to possible reputational damage if his trading is publicly disclosed.
Thus, the real harm to the Journal is not the loss of the exclusivity of
its information, but the threat to its reputation.
The loss of confidential information is only a deprivation of a
"property" interest if the loss threatens the victim with economic
harm, such as selling news information to a competing newspa-
per.' 49 Here, it was not the loss of the information, as such, but the
risk that Winans' insider trading would be disclosed that threatened
the Journal's economic interests. Nevertheless, the Court recog-
nized the main point-that fraud requires an identifiable victim who
stands to suffer economic harm'50 and a defendant who stands to
147 Id. at 179-80.
148 Id.
149 This was the holding of International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S.
215, 236 (1918), quoted by the Court in Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 321.
150 As the government argues in its Supplemental Brief, "McNally is not at all con-
cerned with the means by which the defendant effects his scheme; it addresses only the
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make an unjust profit.
Once this is recognized, the question of what is "property," af-
ter the Court's seemingly inconsistent signals in McNally and Carpen-
ter, answers itself: Property is anything that can satisfy this
requirement. That is, anything that can provide economic loss to
the victim and gain to the defendant including information, reputa-
tion and anything else on which a dollar value can be placed.' 5 1
The Seventh Circuit has used essentially this standard for sev-
eral years to distinguish those fiduciary breach cases which are, and
those which are not, fraud:
[N]ot every breach of duty by an employee works as a criminal fraud
... and receipt of secret profits, standing alone, cannot support a mail
fraud conviction.... When an employee breaches a fiduciary duty to
disclose information to his employer, that breach of duty can support a
mail or wire fraud conviction only if the nondisclosed information was
material to the conduct of the employer's business and the nondisclo-
sure could or does result in harm to the employer.' 52
Thus, in order to have a fraud, there must be, in addition to an
unjust gain, an identifiable victim, as the government conceded in
Carpenter.15s This victim, which can be a corporation, a governmen-
tal entity, or a class of individuals, must have standing to sue for the
economic harm which the defendant caused, or could have caused,
requisite injury to the victim." Supplemental Brief for the United States at 3, Carpenter, 108
S. Ct. 316 (No. 86-422)(emphasis added).
151 The United States argued:
The term [property] surely includes many kinds of valuable proprietary information
such as trade secrets, customer lists, business plans, financial analysis and advice,
and the like. The misappropriation of such information has long been understood
to deprive the owner of something of value [citations omitted].... An individual or
firm's reputation is also an intangible asset with a monetary value.
Supplemental Brief for the United States at 4, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 309.
152 United States v. Feldman, 711 F.2d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
949 (1983). Similarly, in United States v. Wellman, 830 F.2d 1453 (7th Cir. 1987), the
Court, per Judge Eschbach, who also authored Feldman, held that "property" rights
under the mail fraud statute are "rights whose violation would ordinarily result in...
concrete economic [or to use Justice Stevens' term 'monetary'] harm." Wellman, 830
F.2d at 1462. Accord United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d. 12, 19 (2d Cir. 1981), af'd, 722
F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983)("the concealment by a fiduciary of
material information which he is under a duty to disclose to another under circum-
stances where the non-disclosure could or does result in harm to another is a violation
of the [mail fraud] statute").
153 The United States argued the:
right of the citizenry to good government at issue in McNally cannot be valued in
monetary terms, and no individual has an enforceable possessory interest in it. But
many intangibles have monetary value and belong to identifiable persons who are
entitled to exclude other persons; such intangibles are universally thought of as
"property."
Supplemental Brief for the United States at 4, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316.
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it. 154 In this respect the McNally indictment was insufficient. The
"citizens of the State of Kentucky," as opposed to the government,
which was not alleged to have lost anything in McNally, were not an
identifiable victim. They had no standing to sue and they could
point to no concrete economic harm that they suffered or could
have suffered from the scheme. 155 By contrast, in Carpenter, the Wall
Street Journal was an identifiable victim, it had standing to sue and the
misappropriation of its business information had the potential to
cause it economic harm.' 56
In the recent case of United States v. Covino,' 57 the Second Cir-
cuit reversed a conviction on McNally grounds based on similar rea-
soning. In Covino, similarly to the second hypothetical case at the
beginning of this Article, the defendant extorted payments from a
contractor in return for giving the contractor his firm's (NYNEX)
business. 158 There was no evidence that NYNEX was in any way
deprived of money or property or that the contract was adminis-
tered poorly. In fact, the jury was instructed to the contrary. 159 The
basis for the charge was that the defendant took, and failed to dis-
close, the payments, contrary to company policy. 160 Here, there was
an unjust gain and an identifiable victim with standing to sue, but
the victim suffered no loss beyond its intangible, non-property inter-
est in its employee's honest and faithful services. The Second Cir-
cuit reversed the conviction based on McNally, holding that, despite
his unjust gain, the defendant was charged with "depriving NYNEX
of material information concerning breaches of his fiduciary duty,
not with depriving it of property"' 6' Thus, the victim had not suf-
fered any loss of property.
The "materiality" requirement of the Feldman test also solves
the problem posed by Justice Scalia to the Solicitor General at the
oral argument in Carpenter. In the Fred M. Smith Company
One of his employees asks [Mr. Smith] "What does 'M' stand for?"
And Smith says, "Well I will tell you this just in confidence.... It is
Marmaduke. I am really very ashamed of it." The employee writes to
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 The government conceded at oral argument in Carpenter that "there has to be
some kind of harm which is contemplated or risked. [It does not have] to actually even-
tuate." Transcript of Proceedings at 30, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316.
157 837 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1988).
158 Id. at 66-67.
159 Id. at 70.
160 Id.
161 Id. at 72. Accord United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 541 (5th Cir. 1981), modi-
fied on reh'g, 680 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1982)(no fraud when price was fixed by law and
consequently kickback did not cost employer any money).
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a newspaper and says, "You know, Fred M. Smith's middle name is
Marmaduke." And he gets ... five bucks from the newspaper for that.
Is that mail fraud?1 62
The Solicitor General replied that it was not but had difficulty ex-
plaining why.163 His vague allusion to "weight and seriousness"
was, however, essentially correct.' 64 The employee's misdeed must
relate to a material aspect of the employer's business and must cause
(or threaten to cause) the business material1 65 economic harm (un-
less, of course, the employee also owes a fiduciary duty to the em-
ployer personally, as a lawyer would to a client). The breach of trust
in the hypothetical was arguably of a personal, non-fiduciary na-
ture,1 66 was not material, and did not, apparently, cause or threaten
to cause the business economic harm. However, it is clear from Car-
penter that the disclosure of confidential information by one who has a
duty not to disclose 67 as opposed to the nondisclosure of a breach
of trust contemplated in Feldman, certainly can be the basis of a mail
fraud charge; even though such a disclosure could be considered an
"embezzlement" rather than a "fraud."'' 68 Thus, if the employee
learned, in the course of business, that the Fred M. Smith Company
had once sold pornographic literature and had sold this information
to a newspaper, causing the company to lose business, all of the ele-
162 Transcript of Proceedings at 35-36, supra note 156.
163 "I am confident in saying it is not. And now let me try and figure out why not."
Id.
164 Id.
165 The Feldman test should be amended to make it clear that not only must the infor-
mation be material to the business but that the harm to the employer must be material.
Thus, minor employee pilfering of office supplies, in violation of company policy, and
the failure to disclose such pilfering, would not qualify as "fraud" under the federal
statute. There is general agreement on the materiality requirement in the lower courts.
E.g., Ballard, 663 F.2d at 541; United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1337 (D.C. Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984), and cases cited therein.
166 Despite the Supreme Court's use of the term "confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship," Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987), it seems unlikely that it
intended to extend the concept of "fraud" to any breach of confidence. Thus, if A's
personal friend discloses A's secrets to the newspapers, even for money, there is not a
fraud. Rather, there must be a fiduciary (i.e., legally recognized relationship of trust)
breach before disclosure or nondisclosure of information can be a fraud. In the hypo-
thetical in the text, it is unclear whether the breach would be of a personnel or fiduciary
relationship.
167 It is also clear from Carpenter that Winans' fiduciary relationship was necessary to
make this a fraud. "[A] person who acquires special knowledge or information by virtue
of a confidential or fiduciary relationship with another is not free to exploit that knowl-
edge or information for his own personal benefit .. ." Id. at 321. Thus, if Winans were
visiting at the Journal, saw confidential information on someone's desk, and traded on
that information, there might be a theft, but there would be no fraud.
168 E.g., United States v. Gray, 790 F.2d 1290 (6th Cir. 1986) (the lower court decision
in McNally); United States v. Alexander, 741 F.2d. 962, 964 (7th Cir. 1984).
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ments of fraud would have been met.169
Having posited that mail fraud requires at least the potential for
both loss and gain, the question arises as to what the defendant's
mens rea must be as to these two elements.
Suppose that Winans had met Felis at a cocktail party and that
Felis but not Winans had recognized the potential for gain in ad-
vance information about the "Heard" column. Consequently he
pumped Winans for this information and Winans, unthinkingly,
gave it to him. Winans is thus, at most, reckless as to both theJour-
nal's loss and anybody's gain. Most Would agree that this is not a
"scheme to defraud." Why not? Because there was neither an in-
tent to gain nor any knowingly fraudulent behavior.
While, as noted, there has begun to be some recognition in the
lower courts of the need to prove both a gain and a loss, 170 no court
has yet focused on what the appropriate mens rea should be as to
both of these elements. There has, however, been considerable
agreement that, as to the victim's loss (or employer's loss when the
defendant is an employee), the appropriate mens rea is "reasonably
foreseeable."1 7 1 That is, as the D.C. Circuit held, the jury must find
that "the non-disclosure furthers a scheme to abuse the trust of an
employer in a manner that makes an identifiable harm to him, apart
from the breach itself, reasonably foreseeable."' 172
This view is borne out by the holding in Carpenter in which lia-
bility, as discussed, was based on unjust gain as well as potential
deprivation of something of value. 173 Winans intended an unjust
gain but he did not intend to harm the Journal. The only way the
Journal could be harmed was if he manipulated the column to ad-
vance his interests, which the evidence showed he did not do, 174 or
169 Of course, certain employee disclosures might be subject to protection under the
first amendment or "whistle-blower" statutes, but the discussion of such disclosures is
beyond the scope of this Article.
170 United States v. Baldinger, 838 F.2d 176 (6th Cir. 1988).
171 United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1337 (D.C. Cir. 1983). See also United
States v. Vor Barta, 635 F.2d 999, 1005 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998
(1981)(requires that scheme was devised with specific intent to defraud); Brief for the
United States at 20, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 316.
172 Brief for the United States at 20.
173 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 321. This mens rea element of intent to gain is in contra-
distinction to that which the Supreme Court has already established for the mailing ele-
ment. In Periera v. United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), the Court held that the defendant
need not intend the mailing, rather, the mailing need only "reasonably be foreseen." Id.
at 9. However, the establishment of a lesser, or even no, mens rea for the jurisdictional
element has long been approved by the Court. E.g., United States v. Feola, 420 U.S.
671, 684 (1975)(no mens rea required as to the jurisdictional element "federal officer"
in the crime of assault on federal officer, 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1982)).
174 Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. at 319.
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if the scheme became public knowledge, which Winans assiduously
sought to avoid.175 Rather, he disregarded a reasonably foreseeable
risk that the Journal would be harmed-negligence in Model Penal
Code terms.17 6
As for the gain, inherent in every fraud scheme prosecuted by
the government, with the exception of Baldinger which was reversed
by the court of appeals, 177 is an intent to gain. So it was at common
law: "Every one commits the misdemeanor called cheating who
fraudulently obtains the property of another by any deceitful
practice."1'78
To the same effect was the original false pretense statute which
required that the defendant "knowingly and designedly by false pre-
tense or pretenses obtain [property]."179 Thus, in the cocktail party
hypothetical, Winans, though he should, perhaps, have reasonably
foreseen that disclosure of the information might harm the Journal,
had no purpose to gain. Consequently, there is no fraud. Even if
Winans had knowingly violated the Journal's non-disclosure rules,
there would be no "scheme to defraud" because there was no pur-
pose to gain.180
Finally, as the false pretense statute just quoted indicated, in
fraud the defendant must proceed "knowingly and designedly by
false pretense." That is, if an individual makes a representation, he
or she must know it to be false and if he acts misleadingly, he or she
must know it.181 When the defendant is charged with breaching a
fiduciary duty to disclose certain facts or with acting in breach of
that duty, the same standard should apply. 'That is, he or she must
know of the duty and knowingly breach it.182
A final point must be made about the elements of mail fraud
after McNally and Carpenter. As discussed, in the classic fraud, the
175 Appellant's Brief at 7-8, Carpenter, 108 S. Ct. 316.
176 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01(2)(d) (1980)("A person acts negligently with respect to
a material element of an offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifi-
able risk that the material element ... will result from his conduct.").
177 See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text. Even in Baldinger there was evi-
dence of an intent to gain, though this was not proved. United States v. Baldinger, 838
F.2d 176, 179-80 (6th Cir. 1988).
178 J. STEPHEN, DIGEST OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 406 (8th ed. 1947)(Stephen goes on to
discuss the common law limitation of "affecting the public at large" which was elimi-
nated by the 1757 statute.).
179 30 Geo. 2, ch. 24 (1757).
180 Thus, I disagree with Professor Coffee who would find criminal liability if the fidu-
ciary duty is knowingly breached and there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of harm to
the victim. Coffee, Tort to Crime, supra note 75, at 124.
181 See, e.g., 2 W. LAFAvE & A. ScoTT, supra note 80, § 8.7 (f(1)("the defendant to be
guilty [of false pretenses] must know that his representation is false").
182 See Coffee, Tort to Crime, supra note 75, at 124, 164.
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victim hands over something of value to the defendant. When the
victim is defrauded of tangible property, such as money or a cow, his
or her loss necessarily is the defendant's gain, and this was, there-
fore, an inevitable aspect of traditional fraud. When intangibles are
involved, by contrast, it is possible that the loss and the gain may
not be the same. Thus, in Carpenter, as discussed, the Journal's po-
tential loss was to its reputation; Winans' gain was confidential in-
formation and insider trading profits. However, the Court claimed
that the loss was the exclusive use of confidential information, the
same as the gain. Since the Court strained in Carpenter to claim that
the gain was the same as the loss, it might be thought that it in-
tended to adopt the traditional view of this. On the other hand,
since it abandoned the traditional view in allowing a prosecution
based on intangible property rights in the first place, it is reasonable
to suppose that it would not insist on a loss/gain identity. Given
that this problem will frequently arise in intangible property cases,
and that the defendant is no less culpable because the loss
threatened to the victim is not the same as the gain, it would be
unreasonable for the courts to insist on this limitation.
In summary, the best way to reconcile McNally, Carpenter and the
history of fraud (to the somewhat limited extent that they are recon-
cilable) is to conclude that mail fraud includes, in addition to the
requisite mailings, a scheme in which the defendant, through knowingly de-
ceitful behavior, intends an economic gain and is at least negligent as to eco-
nomic harm to the victim. 18 3 The "deceitful behavior" can include a
breach of fiduciary duty. Thus, Winans committed fraud the first
time he disclosed confidential information, with the requisite intent
as to gain and loss.
Consider how this formulation applies to a particular, contro-
versial case, United States v. Bronston.18 4 In Bronston the defendant, a
partner in a law firm, secretly worked for Client B, while his firm was
representing Client A, both of which clients were competing for a
city contract. However, Bronston did not use his fiduciary position
183 Contrary to the scheme of Professor Coffee, an element of causation, or use of it as
an affirmative defense is not included. A "scheme to defraud" clearly requires no actual
loss and hence no "causation" of such a loss. The important point is that the defendant
have the appropriate mens rea as to loss, not that he or she actually cause it. While it
could be argued that Bronston's breach did potentially harm the client, in my view, such
causation is not required as long as the defendant was negligent as to harm.
184 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 915 (1982). Bronston has been
heavily criticized by both Hurson, supra note 75, at 431, and Coffee, Tort to Crime, supra
note 75, at 130.
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to harm Client A. 185 Bronston was convicted of defrauding Client
A.18
6
Contrary to Professor Coffee, 187 I have no difficulty with the
Bronston case. Bronston knowingly breached his fiduciary duty to
Client A, intended to gain from that breach and could reasonably
foresee that the breach would cause harm to Client A. That is, he
intended that, through his efforts, Client B should get the contract
rather than Client A. The fact that he did not use his position to gain
extra advantage, as Winans did, does not deny that the breach
caused, or could have caused the harm. Accordingly, under the
reading of Carpenter and McNally advanced in this Article, Bronston
committed fraud.18 8
III. ISSUES INVOLVED IN PENDING CASES
Two questions are raised by McNally which affect pending cases.
They will be dealt with briefly. They are whether McNally is retroac-
tive and whether a conviction must be reversed when based upon
both property and intangible (non-property) rights theories of mail
fraud.
A. RETROACTIVITY
As to cases pending on direct review, there is no question but
that the McNally holding applies. 189 The more difficult issue is
whether McNally should be applied to convictions that were final
185 Or so it was assumed for the purposes of this case. Bronston, 658 F.2d at 926; see
also id. at 931 (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting).
186 Id. at 930. Since Bronston took $12,500.00 from Client B, which he did not turn
over to his firm, id., he could certainly have been charged with defrauding the firm of
this money. This was not the charge, however.
187 Coffee, Tort to Crime, supra note 75, at 130-33.
188 Professor Coffee would only have found a fraud in Bronston if the defendant had
used his fiduciary position to harm the firm's client, as, for example, by giving confiden-
tial information about Client A from the firm's files, to Client B. However, under the
test he proposed, it could be argued that there was liability: "[I]t is insufficient that
there be a fiduciary breach and a pecuniary gain to the defendant or loss to the victim;
rather the former must in some way cause the latter." Id. at 132. I agree with this
standard. It is inherent in the notion that the victim's loss must be reasonably foresee-
able. However, as long as the defendant engages in conduct that is a breach of duty and
will reasonably foreseeably cause harm to the victim, I do not agree that the harm must
be "directly" caused by the breach.
189 As the First Circuit recently held in United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515, 520 (1st
Cir. 1988)(quoting Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 102 (1974)), "[o]ur prior
decisions establish a general rule that a change in the law occurring after a relevant
event in a case will be given effect while the case is pending on direct review." Accord
Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 S. Ct. 314, 328 (1987)(new criminal procedure rules apply to
cases pending on direct review).
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before that decision was rendered. The federal courts are split on
this issue with the Second Circuit, joined by District Courts in Flor-
ida and Maryland finding McNally retroactively applicable to final
convictions' 90 and District Courts in Pennsylvania and Michigan
holding to the contrary.19 1
In Ingber v. Enzor the Second Circuit held that McNally was fully
retroactive because it was a "ruling that a trial court lacked authority
to convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place," 192 rely-
ing on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Johnson.193
The Second Circuit dismissed the recent decision of Griffith v. Ken-
tucky, 194 which held that new decisions are not normally given such
full retroactivity, as inapplicable because it was a case involving
"rules of criminal procedure" rather than "a new rule of substantive
law." 195
The problem of retroactivity is similiar to that of the defend-
ants' challenges to guilty pleas. In both cases, it is necessary to bal-
ance the virtues of finality against the concern that a particular
defendant has been unjustly imprisoned. Professor Westen has ad-
vanced a test to distinguish between those issues that may and those
that may not be raised after a guilty plea that seems useful in the
retroactivity context:
[A] defendant who has been convicted on a plea of guilty may chal-
lenge his conviction on any constitutional ground that, if asserted
before trial, would forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid con-
viction against him, regardless of how much the state might endeavor
to correct the defect. In other words, a plea of guilty may operate as a
forfeiture of all defenses except those that, once raised, cannot be
"cured."1 96
When this test is applied in the retroactivity context, the result
depends on the facts of the particular case. In a case like McNally, as
this Article will discuss, 197 even if the conviction is reversed, there is
a factual basis for a new mail fraud conviction, under a "money or
property" theory, without resort to the now discredited "intangible
190 Ingber v. Enzor, 841 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1988); Belt v. United States, 679 F. Supp.
1088, 1091 (M.D. Fla. 1988); United States v. Mandel, 672 F. Supp. 864, 875 (D. Md.
1987).
191 United States v. Smith, 675 F. Supp. 978 (M.D. Pa. 1987); United States v. Calla-
nan, 671 F. Supp. 487, 488-94 (E.D. Mich. 1987).
192 Ingber, 841 F.2d at 453-54.
193 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
194 479 U.S. 314 (1987).
195 Ingber, 841 F.2d. at 454 n.l.
196 Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Crim-
inal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214, 1226 (1977)(emphasis added).
197 See infra notes 220-23 and accompanying text.
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right to good government" approach. Consequently, since the gov-
ernment is not "forever precluded from obtaining a valid convic-
tion,"' 198 McNally should not be applied retroactively to such a case.
If, on the other hand, the only factual basis for the defendants' con-
viction is an "intangible rights" theory, then McNally should be ap-
plied retroactively and his or her conviction reversed because a valid
conviction can never be had. Thus, there should be no retrials due
to McNally. Only those cases which could not be retried receive ret-
roactive application. In the others, since the facts on the record ap-
pear to support a valid conviction, retroactive application of McNally
is not warranted. 199
B. CONVICTIONS BASED IN PART ON IMPROPER THEORIES
The second issue concerns convictions, subject to possible re-
versal after McNally, which were also based on a still valid money or
property theory. A conflict in the circuits has developed on this is-
sue.200 The First Circuit confronted the issue in United States v.
Ochs.201 There the defendants, including the city's Building Inspec-
tor, had grossly understated a construction estimate so as to defraud
the city of $12,000 that would have been paid for a building permit
had the estimate been accurate (only about $12,000 of the $24,000
owed was paid). The indictment charged a conspiracy both to de-
fraud the city of money and of the loyal and faithful services of its
employee.20 2 The Court quoted Zant v. Stephens,203 stating that "a
general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it
could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of
those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested
exclusively on the insufficient ground." 20 4
198 Westen, supra note 175, at 1226.
199 The "full retroactivity" position taken by the Second Circuit leads to ironic results
as Professor Lynch pointed out in a- letter to the author:
If the Second Circuit and I are right that convictions invalid under McNally must be
vacated, but you are right (as I think you are) that many of the cases previously tried
on the "honest and faithful services" theory could easily be recharged with a show-
ing of pecuniary harm, then McNally becomes a fairly perverse exercise: minimal
effect on the kinds of cases the government can bring, combined with maximum
disruption of settled convictions in cases in which the prosecutors would almost
always have gotten convictions, if they'd had advance notice of the requirements.
Letter from Professor Gerard Lynch to Craig Bradley (August 16, 1988).
200 Compare United States v. Ochs, 842 F.2d 515 (1st Cir. 1988) and United States v.
Italiano, 837 F.2d 1480 (11 th Cir. 1988) with United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147
(5th Cir. 1987) and United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987).
201 842 F.2d 515 (Ist Cir. 1988).
202 Id. at 517-18.
203 462 U.S. 862, 881 (1983).
204 Ochs, 842 F.2d at 520 (quoting Zant, 462 U.S. at 881).
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However, the First Circuit further recognized that aft exception
exists "if the uncertainty as to the ground upon which the jury relied
can be eliminated. ' 20 5 This can be done either "where a verdict
based on any ground would mean that the jury found every element
necessary to support the conviction on the sufficient ground" 20 6 or
"where extrinsic factors in the record make it clear that, although
the jury could have relied on insufficient ground, it did not, in fact,
do so."207 In Ochs, the Court pointed to repeated instructions to the
jury that the "scheme need not financially harm the city of Bos-
ton." 208 Accordingly, since the jury may have based its verdict on
the improper theory, the conviction had to be reversed. 20 9
By contrast, in United States v. Piccolo2 10 the trial judge had in-
structed the jury that, in order to find the defendant guilty in a
"kickback" case 21' it had to find that he had participated in a scheme
to defraud the employer of "its right to the honest and faithful serv-
ices of its employee and "to defraud (the employer) of money." 212
The court of appeals, recognizing that the "honest and faithful serv-
ices" theory had been disapproved by McNally, nevertheless af-
firmed the conviction on the basis of the "money" theory. 213
Assuming that the indictment similarly alleged both theories,21 4
then this is surely correct. Given the clear proof that the defendant
did, in fact, defraud the employer of money there has been no vari-
ance as to "affect the substantial rights of the accused."2 15
In United States v. Richerson 216 and United States v. Runnels,21 7 the
205 Id.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at 524. See also United States v. Italiano, 837 F.2d 1480, 1482 (11th Cir.
1988)(indictment alleged only the "intangible right to good government" theory). The
government argued that nevertheless, a deprivation of money had been shown by the
coincidence. Id. at 1485. The Court properly rejected this argument out of hand.
209 This result was consistent with McNally itself where the Court reversed the convic-
tion, despite the "money" langauge in the indictment because "there was nothing in the
jury charge that required such a finding." McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875,
2882 (1987).
210 835 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2014 (1987).
211 The defendant was charged with participating in a kickback scheme whereby one
McCuen informed a subcontractor to his company that it could increase its bid by
$303,000 and still be the low bidder. McCuen and the other participants, including
Piccolo, then split the $303,000 with the subcontractor. Id. at 518.
212 Id. at 520. Thejudge also required the jury to find that the employee's nondisclo-
sure was capable of causing "business harm" to the employer. Id. at 522 (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting).
213 Id. at 520.
214 The court does not discuss what the indictment alleged.
215 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 82 (1935).
216 833 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987).
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courts upheld convictions of defendants despite the fact that they
had been convicted on an intangible rights theory, which did not
require, as in Piccolo, that the jury also find a deprivation of money
or property. The courts reasoned that since the evidence in fact
showed a deprivation of property, 218 a conviction was proper, de-
spite the indictment which required no such finding. This goes
against the fundamental rule that a defendant may not be convicted
of a crime for which he has not been indicted. 219
IV. AVOIDING THE IMPACT OF MCNALLY
It follows from the discussion of McNally and Carpenter that
mere unjust gain cases, in which no loss or potential loss to a victim
is shown, cannot be fraud. This type of arrangement has typified
many of the important political corruption cases tried by the gov-
ernment, including McNally itself.220 However, while it is theoreti-
cally possible to reap a benefit at the expense of no one,221 in most
cases where the prospective defendant has obtained an unjust gain,
a victim who has suffered a concrete economic loss may be found.
In McNally finding such a victim would not have been difficult. The
prosecutor should have asked someone from Wombwell the follow-
ing question at the trial: "If you had not paid this $200,000 to Seton
Investments what would you have done with it?" Answer: "Distrib-
uted it to other qualifying insurance agencies at Hunt's direc-
tion. ' 222 Thus there is a victim-a victim that could sue via a class
action and that suffered concrete, material ($200,000) economic
harm-the class of legitimate Kentucky insurance agents. Similarly,
in Isaacs, one should not conclude too quickly that, since all that
Governor Kerner did was grant extra racing days to the parties that
bribed him, nobody lost. Arguably, if new racing days were avail-
able, then the class of other racetrack owners, who didn't have an
217 833 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1987), af'd, 842 F.2d 909 (1988).
218 Moreover, that "constructive trust" theory was, in my view, wrong. See infra note
235 and accompanying text.
219 Russell v. United States, 367 U.S. 749, 770 (1962). See United States v. Ochs, 842
F.2d 515, 523 (1st Cir. 1988).
220 See also United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S.913 (1983); United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, aff'd, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
221 Hypothetical Case 2 is such a situation. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying
text.
222 A Kentucky law required that the Commissions only be distributed among bona
fide insurance agencies. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.9-100, 304.9-420 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1981).
1988] 607
CRAIG M. BRADLEY
opportunity to use, or to bid on, those new dates, lost a lot of money
because of the bribery scheme.
The finding of economic loss to an identifiable victim is even
easier in the employee kickback cases. 223 If the employee receives
kickbacks from a supplier to buy the supplier's product for the em-
ployer, then the employer has suffered economic harm in the
amount of the kickback. The kickback demonstrates that, even if the
supplier was supplying the product at a fair market price, he or she
was, in fact, willing to supply it at a lesser price-the charged price
minus the kickback. Unlike the political corruption cases, it is not
even necessary to use a class of victims or to speculate about their
losses; both the victim and its loss are clearcut.2 24
The only time that this technique will not work is when, as in
hypothetical Case 2, the employee's actions have nothing to do with
the price. If the government can't prove that the company lost
money through the corrupt actions of its employee, then it has not
shown fraud. 225 Similarly, in the political corruption cases it may
sometimes be impossible to track down even a class of victims who
lost by the corrupt officials' actions. However, even these cases may
sometimes be subject to prosecution after McNally.
Reconsider the mail fraud statute: It prohibits both use of the
mails in a scheme to defraud (Clause 1) or in a scheme "for ob-
taining money or property by means of false pretenses, representa-
tions or promises." 226 As previously noted, the government urged
in McNally that the scheme charged there should be considered such
an "obtaining" scheme, but the Court ignored that argument hold-
ing that "there was nothing in the jury charge that required such a
finding." 227 But what if the government, in McNally, had simply in-
dicted the defendants for "obtaining money by false representa-
tions: to wit the claim to Wombwell that Seton Investments was a
bona fide insurance agency." 228 Such a charge surely fits the lan-
guage of the statute. While Congress may not have "intended" to
expand the scope of the statute to cover such "unjust gain but no
223 E.g., United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827
(1973).
224 The Fifth Circuit has recognized that such cases cause economic loss to the em-
ployer. See United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
697 (1988) and cases cited therein.
225 Accord United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1981), modified on reh'g, 680
F.2d 352 (1982).
226 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1982).
227 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2882 (1987). This is a true statement
but somewhat misleading since the indictment did charge this as one theory of the case.
228 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2882.
[Vol. 79608
THE ESSENCE OF MAIL FRA UD
loss" cases, by using the phrase "obtaining money or property by
false pretenses, representations or promises" it not only focused on
the "gain" type of crime, it explicitly went beyond the common un-
derstanding of the crime of false pretenses. As discussed, histori-
cally, "false pretenses" was thought to be limited to inducing a loss
as well as to representations as to past or present facts. The 1909
amendment expanded the coverage of the statute to include other
"representations or promises" which may not amount to false pre-
tenses. It is a fundamental of statutory construction that, if the lan-
guage of the statute is clear, a contrary intent of the legislature will
not ordinarily be considered. 229 Here, the mere marginal note cit-
ing Durland in a Senate Report is hardly sufficient to override such
clear statutory language. Thus Clause 2 requires an unjust gain, but
no loss. 230
It might be argued that, by reading the statute as embodying
the historic understanding of fraud to include money or property,
the Court was also, at least implicitly, suggesting that the historic
notion that a fraud required loss to a victim must similarly be incor-
porated into the entire statute. This argument misconceives the Mc-
Nally holding. The Court did not hold that Clause 1 and Clause 2
mean the same thing.23 1 It explicitly declined to address itself to the
applicability of Clause 2 to the McNally indictment.232 While it is
certainly true that "false pretenses" meant the same thing as fraud
in 1909, and therefore required a deprivation of money or property,
the 1909 amendment went beyond the common law understanding
of "false pretenses" to forbid "obtaining money or property by false
229 E.g., Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1980). "When we find the terms
of a statute unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete, except in 'rare and exceptional
circumstances.''" TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S 153, 187 n.33 (1978) (quoting Crooks v. Harrel-
son, 282 U.S. 55, 60 (1930)).
230 In drawing this conclusion, I am not unmindful of Judge Easterbrook's observa-
tion that "the invocation of 'plain meaning' just sweeps under the rug the process by
which meaning is devined." Easterbrook, Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 536
(1983). Still, in the conduct of everyday life, people constantly assume, and act on the
assumption, that words really do have a meaning that is frequently "plain." The phrase
in question comprises such words. See, e.g., Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 136
(1946)(Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Ordinary words [in statutes] should be read with
their common, everyday meaning when they serve as directions for ordinary people.").
Note, however, that Justice Frankfurter made this observation shortly after he had ob-
served that "[t]he notion that because the words of a statute are plain, its meaning is also
plain, is merely pernicious oversimplification." United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424,
431 (1943)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
231 "The Court recognizes that the 'money or property' limitation of the second
clause does not actually apply to prosecutions under the first clause." McNally, 107 S.
Ct. at 2885 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
232 Id. at 2881.
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• . . representations or promises." Given this clear statutory lan-
gauge (unlike the "to defraud" language interpreted in McNally) an
"unjust gain" scheme should be prosecutable under Clause 2 with-
out reference to any loss.
The "unjust gain" approach is a preferable theory for the gov-
ernment because, unlike the fraud theory, it does not require proof
of loss. Defendants could, however, argue with some force that it
requires an affirmative misrepresentation. 233 This would provide a
certain symmetry to the statute, requiring the government to prove
loss (but no affirmative misrepresentation) in a fraud case and an
affirmative misrepresentation but no loss in an "unjust gain" case.
However, as previously discussed, the crime of false pretenses tradi-
tionally could be satisfied by actions or by a failure to disclose that
which the defendant had a duty to disclose. 23 4 There is no reason to
suppose that Congress, by adding Clause 2 to the statute intended
to change the meaning of "false pretenses." 23 5 While the statute, by
its very terms, must be read as expanding on traditional false pre-
tenses by adding "representations or promises," there is absolutely
no reason to read it as, at the same time, narrowing false pretenses to
require an affirmative representation. Misleading actions, or a fail-
ure to speak when there is a duty to do so, while they may not be
"representations or promises," continue to be "false pretenses" af-
ter the 1909 amendment. Thus, the lawyer who fails to disclose a
conflict of interest to his or her client and is then paid by that client
has obtained money by false pretenses, whether or not the client
stood to be harmed. However, the false pretenses must be directed toward
the payor, otherwise the property has not been obtained "by means of false
pretenses" as required by the statute. Thus, as will be discussed,2 36 the
highway commissioner who accepts money to grant a highway con-
tract to a contractor has not violated the statute, for he or she has
233 As it seemed to in American federal law prior to 1907. Goldstein, supra note 51, at
425.
In the 1907 case of United States v. Robbins, 157 F. 999, 1001 (D. Utah 1907), the
court held that an affirmative misstatement was not required in conspiracy to defraud
the government cases, reflecting the trend in civil law. Goldstein, supra note 51, at 425.
In 1910 the Supreme Court upheld the conviction of a government employee for con-
spiracy to defraud the United States when he sold confidential government information
about grain prices, despite the fact that the he had made no representations or promises
to any official. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462 (1910). See generally Goldstein, supra note
51, at 425-26 (discussing the abandonment, in the early twentieth century federal law of
fraud, of the requirement that there be an affirmative misstatement). What impact these
decisions had on Congress reenactment of the mail fraud statute in 1909 is a difficult
question.
234 See supra note 97.
235 See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987).
236 See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text.
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not obtained money by means of any false pretense (unless the gov-
ernment can establish a case using unsuccessful bidders, rather than
the bribe-payor as the victim).
Consider the recent case of United States v. Murphy.237 Murphy
was a Tennessee judge who used an inactive Masonic lodge to apply
for a state bingo license under the state's "charitable organization"
exception to the gambling laws. He used a false name and falsely
asserted that he was a member of a charitable organization and that
no member of the organization would profit personally from the
game. 23 8 He then split the profits with one Smith who operated the
game. He was convicted of eleven counts of mail fraud.23 9 The
court of appeals reversed the conviction. The indictment charged
that the defendant had "defraud[ed] the State of Tennessee of the
right to issue certificates of registration ... based on complete true
and accurate information. ' 240 The court concluded that this right
was an intangible, not a property right: "[T]he certificate of registra-
tion... may well be 'property' once issued, insofar as the charitable
organization is concerned, but certainly an unissued certificate of
registration is not property of the State of Tennessee and once is-
sued it is not the property of the State of Tennessee. "241
The State suffered no economic loss here and therefore was not
deprived of property. However, the defendant dearly did acquire an
economic gain by means of false representations. Accordingly, he
should have been prosecuted under Clause 2. By the same token, in
election fraud cases, while it may be argued that a defendant who
has won an election by fraudulent means has not defrauded the state
or city of money or property because it would have paid out the
elected official's salary anyway,242 it is certainly true that the defend-
ant has obtained money (the salary of the office) by means of false
pretenses or representations (e.g., the representation that the
bought or forged votes are valid).243 Thus the election fraud cases
cited by Justice Stevens in his McNally dissent244 could still be prose-
cuted under the mail fraud statute.
To summarize this approach, then, the government would have
to prove that the defendant engaged in a (1) scheme to intentionally
237 836 F.2d 248 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 307 (1988).
238 Id. at 249.
239 Id.
240 Id. at 251.
241 Id. at 253-54.
242 Though the successful opponent has been defrauded.
243 The candidate may make no such false representation but, normally, one of his or
her confederates will have done so.
244 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2883 n.2 (1987)(Stevens,J., dissenting).
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obtain money or property (2) by means of (3) knowing false pre-
tenses, representations or promises, and (4) used the mails or wires
or caused their use. As in the fraud cases, it would not be necessary
to show that the scheme was successful. As long as the scheme in-
volved money or tangible property, as in McNally, the government's
burden would certainly be less than in a fraud case under Clause 1
because it would not be necessary to prove economic harm to a par-
ticular victim. However, recall that Clause 2 of the statute requires
that a defendant obtain "money or property" and that Congress un-
derstood that to mean money or tangible property. As discussed, in
Carpenter the Court stretched the meaning of "property" to include
certain intangibles but made it fairly clear that the concept of "prop-
erty" itself required economic harm (or potential harm) to an identi-
fiable victim.2 45 Obviously, the concept of "property" means
nothing different in Clause 2 than its implicit meaning in Clause 1.
Thus, to prove an unjust gain case under Clause 2, where the gain is an
intangible, the government, to be consistent with Carpenter, must
prove concrete economic harm to an identifiable victim. Otherwise
the defendant cannot be said to have obtained "property." Carpenter
aside, it would make no sense to prosecute an employee for ob-
taining the employer's darkest secrets unless the employee sought
to use them for his or her own profit (in which case he or she would
have sought to obtain tangible property-the profit). Mere curios-
ity, even when satisfied by means of false representations, should
not be criminalized. The concept of "misappropriating" an intangi-
ble simply makes no sense unless it is accompanied by harm to an
identifiable victim. By contrast, if one takes money or tangible
property that doesn't belong to him or her, a culpable act has oc-
curred, without the victim being identified.
There is another limit on this theory of prosecution that does
not apply to Clause 1 prosecutions. Recall that, in Carpenter, the
Court held that "the concept of fraud' includes the act of embezzle-
ment.246 As discussed, this was a misunderstanding of the "concept
of fraud" and an expansion of the statute. However, whatever may
be said of the "concept of fraud," it is unavoidably true that the
"concept of false pretenses" (representations or promises) does not
include embezzlement, for the two have always been separate
crimes. 247 Consequently, if the fraudulent behavior is embezzle-
ment, larceny by trick, or other similar activity, the government
245 See Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 321 (1987).
246 Id.
247 See 2 W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTw, supra note 97, § 8.6 (Embezzlement), § 8.7 (False
Pretenses).
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must prove that a loss to the victim was reasonably foreseeable.
However, it is hard to imagine an embezzlement or larceny by trick
in which this would not be true anyway.
The above two means of avoiding the thrust of McNally-either
finding a victim or class of victims who lost property or charging an
unjust gain under the second clause of the statute-will be very ef-
fective. They allow the federal government to prosecute, with no
amendment of the mail fraud statute, many of the approximately
thirty-five cases that were cited in Justice Stevens' McNally dissent
that had been previously charged under the "intangible rights" the-
ory.2 4 8 However, one case, United States v. Condolon,24 9 involved a
defendant who falsely held himself out as a talent agent to obtain
sexual favors from women. Assuming that the courts would find no
"economic gain" for the defendant or economic harm to the victim
here, this would not count as "property" under McNally. However,
one could reasonably wonder why the federal government felt it
necessary to prosecute this case in the first place.
Another common case involves politicians and judges who ac-
cept money in order to make decisions favorable to the payor. In
addition to being guilty of bribery under state law, the Hobbs Act 250
and possibly RICO,251 would they still be liable under the mail fraud
statute? In some cases, as in McNally, they would have received
money as a result of a misrepresentation ("Seton is a legitimate in-
surance agency") and could certainly be prosecuted on that ground.
In other cases they will have defrauded their employer, the state or
local government, of money. Finally, in many cases, the unsuccess-
ful bidder or litigant may be identified as a victim who lost money as
a result of the defendant's misrepresentation or breach of fiduciary
duty owed to him or her. However, in many bribery cases there is
248 McNally, 107 S. Ct. at 2883 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
249 600 F.2d 7 (4th Cir. 1979).
250 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a) (1982). The Act provides that "whoever in any way or degree
obstructs, delays or affects commerce.., by robbery or extortion" is guilty. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1951(b) (2) "Extortion" includes acting "under color of official right." The Hobbs Act
has frequently been used to prosecute corrupt politicians who receive bribes. See, e.g.,
United States v. Kenney, 462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1972); United States v. Staszcuk, 502
F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), modified, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.)(en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
837 (1975). Some minimal effect on interstate commerce must be shown, however.
Staszcuk, 502 F.2d at 879.
251 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1982). RICO forbids operating an enterprise (the office in
question) through a pattern (2 or more) of racketeering activity. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)
(1982) lists "bribery" and "extortion which are cognizable under state law as crimes that
constitute "racketeering activity." The commission of two or more acts of racketeering
activities constitutes "a pattern of racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982).
Thus, if two counts of state law bribery may be proved in the federal trial, the RICO
prosecution will likely succeed.
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no victim and no false representation. Consequently, there is no
mail fraud. It would not be enough to argue that the official has
made an implicit promise or explicit oath to conduct his or her office
honestly and that, in receiving bribes, has violated that oath and
thus obtained money by false pretenses. This is nothing more than
the intangible right to honest and faithful services rejected in Mc-
Nally, although under a different clause of the statute. Clearly the
crime of obtaining money by false pretenses assumes that the false
representation is made, directly or indirectly, explicitly or implicitly,
to the party delivering the money or property and that it caused that deliv-
ery.2 52 The corrupt judge, bribed by a criminal defendant, has of-
fered no false pretense, representation or promise, either to the city
or the payor nor, most likely, was his or her oath of office false at the
time it was made. The judge has also not induced the city to part
with property by misleading actions or by silence (unlike in Carpen-
ter). Unless it can be shown that the city lost money in the transac-
tion (as it frequently can be)253 the government will have to be
satisfied with prosecuting under RICO, the Hobbs Act, and state
bribery law, for this is neither a fraud nor the obtainment of money
by means of false pretenses, representations or promises. It is,
rather, a bribery. 254
In order to get around the problems posed by McNally, the gov-
ernment has advanced a more complex argument. This is based on
a footnote to Justice Stevens' dissent in McNally:
When a person is being paid a salary for his loyal services, any breach
252 E.g., F. WHARTON, supra note 112, § 1398. The victim must swear that the "false
representation... induced him to part with his property." Accord Coffee, Tort to Crime,
supra note 75, at 169. The Second Circuit recognized this in United States v. Covino,
837 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 1988)(mail fraud requires a finding that the victim be defrauded
of money or property). Accord United States v. Evans, 844 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir. 1988).
253 See supra note 236. If the principal has lost money, then the defendant is guilty of
fraud under Clause I.
254 Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 628 (1926)(use of the mails to carry out a
scheme of extortion, while "reprehensible" was not a scheme to "defraud").
MODEL PENAL CODE § 223.3 (1980). The Code states:
A person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains property of another by decep-
tion.
A person deceives if he purposely:
1) creates or reinforces a false impression ... or
2) prevents another from acquiring information which would affect his judge-
ment of a transaction; or,
3) fails to correct a false impression which the deceiver previously created or
reinforced, or which the deceiver knows to be influencing another to whom he
stands in a fiduciary or confidential relationship; or,
4) fails to disclose a known lien (etc.)
This statute embodies the traditional offense of false pretenses. MODEL PENAL
CODE § 223.3 commentary at 180 (1980). None of these categories apply to the corrupt
judge in the hypothetical.
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of that loyalty would appear to carry with it some loss of money to the
employer-he is not getting what he paid for. Additionally, "if an
agent receives anything as a result of his violation of a duty of loyalty
to the principal, he is subject to a liability to deliver it, its value, or its
proceeds to the principal." This duty may fulfill the Court's "money
or property" requirement in most kickback schemes.255
This "constructive trust" theory, adopted by a number of courts of
appeal in post-McNally opinions, 256 was rightly rejected by the Sev-
enth Circuit in United States v. Holzer,257 which held that it is "only in
an attenuated and artificial sense that the bribe is the principal's
property." 258 It makes little sense to argue, for example, that bribe
money paid to a state judge is really the state's, for, as the Holzer
court observed, "the State of Illinois does not sell justice. '259
Clearly, there is no "loss" to the employer in any meaningful sense
here, and consequently there is no fraud (in contradistinction to
cases in which the government can show that a kickback to the em-
ployee had the effect of raising the price that the employer paid for
the product).260 Also, as discussed, 26 1 there has been no false rep-
resentation to the employer, so an "unjust gain" theory would not
work either. Only if the government could prove that payments to
the defendant judge had caused him to breach a duty to parties
before him, causing their loss of money or property would this be a
fraud. 26 2 The Hobbs Act and RICO (predicated on state bribery or
federal Hobbs Act violations) would, however be available as the
255 McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2890 n.10 (1987)(Stevens, J. dissent-
ing)(quoting Restatement (Second) of Agency § 403 (1958)).
256 E.g., United States v. Runnels, 833 F.2d 1183, 1188 (6th Cir. 1987), aff'd on reh'g,
842 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988); United States v. Richerson, 833 F.2d 1147, 1157 (5th Cir.
1987).
257 840 F.2d 1343 (7th Cir. 1988).
258 Id. at 1348.
259 Id. Having made these observations the court went on to suggest that a viable
prosecution could be made out if the "corrupt public official, having received bribes,
takes steps to conceal them in order to defeat the public employer's right to obtain them
by a suit based on constructive fraud principles." Id. The idea seems to be that the
employer's interest in the bribe was too "attenuated" to constitute a loss, in part be-
cause it is not clear when the employee is obliged to turn over the proceeds. Neverthe-
less the employer could sue for the proceeds of the bribe, and the employee's attempts
at a coverup would be a fraud. Id. How the government would prove that "the efforts
[at concealment] were designed to prevent the state from obtaining the bribe money, as
distinguished from preventing the state from discovering the bribery" in the first place,
as the court required, id., is not clear.
260 See supra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
261 See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text.
262 Or, of course, if the people who paid money to the judge had in some way been
defrauded. See United States v. Holzer, 840 F.2d 1343, 1345 (7th Cir. 1988).
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Holzer court held. 263
A similar approach was adopted by the Fifth Circuit in United
States v. Richerson.264 After McNally, the government simply argued
that the charge in the indictments, alleging the right of the employer
to his employee's honest and faithful services, was a "property
right." That is, that the defendant defrauded the employer out of
money (his salary) by failing to deliver the honest services for which
he was being paid. But this is nothing more than another way of
stating that the employer has an interest in the honest and faithful
services of its employee, an interest that the Carpenter Court
deemed, "too ethereal to fall within the protection of the mail fraud
statute." 265 The employer would have paid the employee's salary in
any event. Unless an independent economic loss from the fraud can
be shown, the "loss" element has not been satisfied. The First Cir-
cuit properly rejected this approach in United States v. Ochs.266
Another argument was advanced by the government in United
States v. Evans.26 7 There, the defendant conspired to sell arms of
American manufacture to an "Iranian buyer" 268 who was actually an
American undercover agent. The arms were admittedly not owned
by the United States but by foreign countries. Thus it would ap-
pear, that whatever violation of statutes prohibiting arms sales may
have occurred, the United States was in no way defrauded of money
or property. However, the government argued that it maintained an
interest in the resale of American arms to Iran, which resale was
prohibited by law, and that that interest was a "property" interest
under McNally.269 The Second Circuit rejected this argument, hold-
ing, after an analysis of property law, that this was not a "property"
interest at common law. 270 Whatever the resolution of that issue, it
seems clear that, under the test advanced in this Article, the govern-
ment was harmed in its political rather than its economic interests and
consequently, there was no deprivation of "property" as that term is
used in the criminal law of fraud.
The above conclusions about the meaning of the term "fraud"
are based on my reading of the statute, as illuminated by history,
263 Id. at 1350-51. However, Holzer's RICO conviction was vacated because it may
have been predicated on the invalidated mail fraud counts.
264 833 F.2d 1147, 1157 (5th Cir. 1987).
265 Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
266 842 F.2d 515, 523-24 (1st Cir. 1988). Accord United States v. Lytle, 677 F. Supp.
1370, 1381 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
267 844 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988).
268 Id. at 37.
269 Id.
270 Id. at 41-42.
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and of the Carpenter and McNally decisions. The Court squares with
the historic understanding of fraud when it requires a victim, a gain
and a loss. It deviates from history when it allows the gain and loss
to be intangible in nature and, as a concommitant of that holding,
apparently allows the gain to differ from the loss. While the Court
has allowed the concept of "fraud" to expand somewhat, to include
at least some kinds of embezzlement as well as to allow intangible
property as the object of the scheme, still, the basic principle of
these cases, is that the term "fraud," when it appears in a federal
statute, has content. It does not mean "any wrongful behavior." It
does not mean extortion, bribery, or robbery. 271 It means, as it had
always meant, until the recent federal court decisions reversed by
McNally, depriving a victim of property by means of deceit. If the principle
of legality is to have any vitality in American law,2 72 as the Supreme
Court asserts that it has,2 73 then criminal statutes must be construed
according to their ordinary meaning. 274 It is enough to satisfy the
271 As the Court has held in Hammerschmidt v. United States, 265 U.S. 182, 188
(1924), and Fasulo v. United States, 272 U.S. 620, 627-28 (1926).
272 The principle of legality, nulla poena sine lege (no punishment except in accordance
with law), is the basis of the rule, applied in McNally v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2875,
2881 (1987), that criminal statutes be strictly construed. See generally G. WILLIAMS,
CRIMINAL LAW, THE GENERAL PART §§ 184-86 (2d ed. 1961).
As ChiefJustice Marshall observed long ago:
The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less
old than construction itself. It is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights
of individuals; and on the plain principle that the power of punishment is vested in
the legislative, not in the judicial department. It is the legislature, not the Court,
which is to define a crime, and ordain its punishment.
United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat) 76, 95 (1820). SeeJeffries, supra note 80,
at 190 (insightful discussion of the application of the various aspects of the principle in
contemporary American law).
273 "There are no constructive offenses, and before one can be punished it must be
shown that his case is plainly within the statute." Fasulo, 272 U.S. at 629. "Engrained in
our concept of due process is the requirement of notice." Lambert v. California, 355
U.S. 225, 228 (1957).
274 Sometimes statutes or constitutional provisions must be read more broadly than
their ordinary meaning at the time of drafting in order to deal with changes that have
occurred since that drafting. Thus, the Supreme Court was surely correct to consider
electronic eavesdropping to be a "search" in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 367 (1967),
despite the fact that "search" did not include such activity in the late 18th century.
When the government is using a statutory provision as a sword to prosecute criminal
activity, rather than an individual using it as a shield against governmental overacting,
however, the language of the writing in question must be more strictly construed. Thus,
if an 18th century criminal statute forbade people from engaging in certain "searches," I
would have difficulty agreeing that that term applied to electronic surveillance, despite
my agreement with Katz. The principle of legality applies to the interpretation of crimi-
nal prohibitions, not constitutional limitations.
Finally, the breaches of trust punished in the pre-McNally mail fraud prosecutions
did not even present the problem discussed above. Dishonest employees and corrupt
government officials were obviously within the ken of Congress in 1872 and 1909. The
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interests of the federal government that Congress has virtually un-
limited power to declare any wrongful behavior a federal violation,
notwithstanding traditional limitations on federal power.2 75 It is
neither necessary nor proper for the federal courts to take it upon
themselves, in the absence of congressional enactment, to expand
the clear meaning of statutes, in order to reach behavior that the
courts and the Justice Department feel should be punished. 276
While the people singled out for prosecution under the mail fraud
statute may have richly deserved criminal sanction, the fleeting satis-
faction derived from bringing such malefactors to the bar of justice
must be sacrificed for deference to constitutional principles.
V. THE GOVERNMENT STRIKES BACK
As discussed, on August 4, 1987, shortly after McNally was de-
cided, Representative Conyers introduced a bill, H.R. 3089,277 to
counter that holding. The bill simply amended chapter 1, title 1 of
the United States Code to add a definition of "fraud" throughout
the Code as: "1) defrauding another of intangible rights of any
kind whatsoever in any manner or for any purpose whatsoever; or 2)
by using material private information wrongfully stolen or misap-
mail fraud statute could have been written to cover bribery and breaches of duty that did
not result in economic harm. There is simply no reason to believe that it was. Since
deficiencies in statutes are more easily remedied than those in constitutions, it is sensi-
ble to read the former more narrowly than the latter.
275 E.g., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985); Perez v.
United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
276 The approach of the federal courts, simply declaring a variety of wrongful behav-
ior to be "fraud" and therefore punishable, while certainly well intentioned and not
leading to the punishment of innocents, nevertheless is reminiscent of the approach of
the Nazis in Germany. According to the German Act ofJune 28, 1935:
Whoever commits an act which the law declares to be punishable or which is deserv-
ing of punishment according to the fundamental idea of a penal law and sound
popular feeling shall be punished. If there is no penal law applying directly to the
act it shall be punished under the law whose basic idea best fits it.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 272, § 184. As Williams points out, violation of the principle of
legality can also occur in a cause that most would consider "just." The Nuremburg war
crimes trials are an example of this. Id. One could argue that the Nazis, by enacting this
statute, complied with the principle of legality and that their scheme suffered from some
other problem, such as overbreadth.
277 H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. (August 4, 1987). Another bill,
H.R. 3050, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. (July 29, 1987) was introduced by
Representative Mfume. This bill simply added a new § 1346 to title 18 which provided
that:
[a]s used in sections 1341 and 1343, the term 'defraud' includes the defrauding of
the citizens of a body politic-
1) of their right to the conscientious loyal, faithful, disinterested, and unbiased
performance of official duties by a public official thereof; or
2) of their right to have the public business conducted honestly, impartially, free
from bribery, corruption, bias, dishonesty, deceit, official misconduct, and fraud.
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propriated in breach of any statutory, common law, contractual, em-
ployment, personal or other fiduciary relationship." 278
Despite the fact that Congress can define the terms in its Code
any way it likes, with no jurisdictional justification, 279 the bill went
on to state the jurisdictional basis of the bill as including article IV,
section 4 of the Constitution (the United States shall "guarantee to
every State... a Republican Form of Government"). 280 Congress-
man Conyers then presented a lengthy and learned discussion as to
why this clause was an appropriate basis for federal criminal juris-
diction as to state and local government corruption. 28'
The Justice Department, evidently awaiting the outcome of the
Carpenter case, introduced its version on May 12, 1988. The Depart-
ment did not support HR 3089 because it was "too broad" and an
"overreaction" to the McNally decision." 28 2 More specifically, by
changing the definition of "fraud" in the entire code, it would affect
over 500 sections with possible unforeseen consequences. 28 3 Sec-
ond, it would "greatly expand federal authority into a wide range of
commercial and personal matters. ' 28 4 This was an odd objection
for the Department to make since it had just argued in McNally and
Carpenter that it already had this authority under the mail fraud
statute.
Instead the Justice Department proposed a new statute prohib-
iting "public corruption" and providing that anyone who "attempts
to deprive or to defraud by any scheme or artifice, the inhabitants of
a State or political sudivision of a State of the honest services of [its]
official or employee." violates the section.28 5 This statute thus
avoided twisting the term "fraud" to mean something that it had
never meant before, and created a new statute to deal with corrup-
tion of public officials, but not private employees.
While Congress saw the wisdom in avoiding a change in the
meaning of fraud throughout the entire Code, it otherwise rejected
the Department's proposal. Instead, it adopted a new definition of
278 H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (August 4, 1987).
279 Thejurisdictional basis for prosecution under the mail fraud statute would still be
the use of the mails, as is presently the case.
280 H.R. 3089, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. § 3 (3) (August 4, 1987).
281 133 CONG. REC. H10,657 (daily ed. November 19, 1987)(statement of Rep. Cony-
ers)(citing NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, STUDY DRAFT
OF A NEW CRIMINAL CODE 133 (1970)).
282 Hearings on H.R. 3089 Before the House Subcomm. on Criminal Justice, Committee on the
Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (May 12, 1988)(statement of Acting Assistant Attor-
ney General Keeney)[Hereinafter Hearings.]
283 Id. at 6.
284 Id.
285 The Anti-Corruption Act of 1988, S. 2793, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 15, 1988).
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fraud, applicable only to the Mail Fraud statute "that defines the
term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' to include a 'scheme or artifice
to defraud another of the intangible right of honest services.' "286
This statutory change was accompanied by a statement by Rep-
resentative Conyers indicating that it was intended to "restore the
mail fraud provision to where [it] was before the McNally deci-
sion." 28 7 He continued that it "is no longer necessary to determine
whether or not the scheme or artifice to defraud involved money or
property." 288
Since this statute does not change the meaning of "fraud" in
the other 500 odd times it appears in the Code, everything said
about the meaning of fraud in this Article would still be applicable
to those sections. Indeed, Congress' decision, contrary to Repre-
sentative Conyers' original proposal, not to change the definition of
fraud throughout the Code, may be taken as an accession to Mc-
Nally's narrow reading of the term.28 9
If this change in the mail fraud statute is read narrowly by the
courts, it will have little impact on the law as it now stands after
Carpenter. While Congress expanded the mail fraud statute beyond
"money or property," the Court had already done this, in effect, in
Carpenter. Congress did not eliminate the requirement, implicit in
McNally and Carpenter, that the concept of fraud includes an identifi-
able victim. Indeed, the new requirement that the government
show that the defendant deprived another of the intangible right of
honest services surely requires that this "other" be identified and,
for his or her "right" to be established, the defendant should owe
this individual a fiduciary duty.
It is clear, on the other hand, that the requirement of economic
gain to the defendant and loss to the victim has been eliminated.
However, the government would be well advised not to rely too
heavily on this innovation and, instead, to try to define the defend-
ant's gain and the victim's loss in economic terms. In Carpenter, the
Court held that the employer's right to its employee's "honest and
faithful service" was "an interest too ethereal in itself to fall within
the mail fraud statute." 290 It is at best unseemly and at worst sub-
286 134 CONG. REc. H11,251 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988).
287 Id. (statement of Rep. Conyers).
288 Id. (statement of Rep. Conyers).
289 But see Haas v. Henkel, 216 U.S. 462, 480 (1910), discussed in McNally v. United
States, 107 S. Ct. 2875, 2881 n.8 (1987)(Court had already read the "money or prop-
erty" requirement out of the term "defraud" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (conspir-
acy to defraud the United States)).
290 Carpenter v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 316, 320 (1987).
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ject to reversal on vagueness grounds, for the government to prose-
cute people on a theory deemed "ethereal". by the Supreme Court,
whatever Congress says. This is particularly true where the statute
can be read as prohibiting mere dishonest statements which may be
protected by the first amendment,291 and where it is apparently in-
tended to apply to people like Mr. McNally and/or Mr. Hunt, who
had no fiduciary relationship with the "people of the State of Ken-
tucky." "Men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
[the] meaning" of such a statute.292 Since, in the normal case, eco-
nomic loss and gain can be readily identified, the government
should strive to do so.
If, on the other hand, the courts read this statute broadly, as
they are wont to do, 293 it may create difficulties unanticipated by
Congress. While the concept of "money and property" is not en-
tirely clear after Carpenter, it at least has a concrete grounding in
economic gain and loss. But what is the "intangible right of honest
service," to the extent that it goes beyond such economically moti-
vated behavior? Did the citizens of Kentucky have such a right as to
McNally, a private citizen, or Hunt, the Democratic Party chairman?
Certainly a court could conclude that they did, given Congress' in-
tent to overrule McNally.294 Does a Governor who, for purely polit-
ical purposes, dissembles about his intent to raise taxes, or his
knowledge of a judicial nominee's background, deprive the citizens
of his "honest services?" What of a lobbyist who invites a member
of Congress to spend a weekend at a resort or a corporation which
pays him to give a speech? Such lobbying efforts are obviously
aimed at gaining an advantage for the party offering them, an advan-
tage that an enthusiastic prosecutor and willing jury could well
deem to be an attempt to deprive the citizens of the "honest serv-
ices" of their representative. If history is to be the guide, the Justice
Department and the courts will find cases to prosecute that were
never contemplated by the drafters of the bill. Instead of the debate
focusing on whether or not "fraud" includes certain, obviously cor-
rupt, but not necessarily loss-producing behavior, such as in Mandel
and McNally, the focus will now become whether mere dishonesty by
public and private employees, unaccompanied by any corrupt ec6-
291 The vagueness problem is particularly acute where, as here, "a statute's literal
scope.., is capable of reaching expression sheltered by the first amendment." Smith v.
Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 573 (1974).
292 Connally v. Gen. Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
293 See, e.g., Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 AM. GRIM. L. REV.
213, 245 (1984).
294 Though, as noted, the words of the statute could be read as requiring a fiduciary
relationship.
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nomic motive, violates the new statute. The words of the statute
suggest that it does. Congress may find, to the discomfort of its own
members, that it has let a genie out of a bottle that was best left
corked.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Court in McNally and Carpenter went back, but not all the
way back, to basics with the mail fraud statute. The holdings require
that, as traditionally was the case, a "fraud" requires the govern-
ment to prove that a victim suffered, or stood to suffer, economic
harm and that the defendant stood to obtain an unjust economic
gain. The holding of McNally that the victim's loss must be of
"money or property" was rendered nugatory by Carpenter. Any dep-
rivation of an intangible interest that could give rise to economic
harm may be the basis of the fraud prosecution. And, while it is
necessary that the victim stand to lose and the defendant to gain, it
is not necessary that the victim's loss be the defendants gain, for
such was not the case in Carpenter. The mens rea as to these ele-
ments is intent or purpose to gain, negligence as to loss and knowl-
edge as to the fraudulent behavior. In many of the cases previously
tried under "intangible rights" theories, the government could have
identified a victim who suffered an economic loss and successfully
prosecuted the case according to the McNally strictures. While a
"scheme to defraud" requires a gain and a loss, the crime described
in Clause 2 of the statute, "obtaining money or property by false
pretenses, representations or promises," clearly does not require
any proof of loss. Defendants who, by knowingly false representa-
tions or breaches of fiduciary duty, obtain property to which they
are not entitled have violated this statute. However, even in these
cases the government must prove the false pretense or breach of a
duty to disclose. In the normal bribery case the defendant makes no
false representation. He is guilty of bribery, not fraud, and there is
no justification for reading a statute that prohibits fraud as operat-
ing against all forms of dishonest behavior.
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